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Outdoor recreation research has focused mainly on the demand side 
because of the difficulty of measuring willingness to pay for a service that 
cannot be inferred directly from market data. The research effort has been 
fruitful but as Matulich, Workman, and Jukenville (1987) have recently stated, 
the supply side of outdoor recreation has not received sufficient attention in the 
literature since it has been generally assumed that there are no significant 
problems on model specification or empirical estimation. Recreation economics 
is a policy-oriented subdiscipline and it should incorporate management criteria 
in its research (McConnell, 1985). 
Water and related land-based recreation benefits at the McClellan-Kerr 
Arkansas River Navigation System have been estimated by Schreiner, Willet, 
Badger, and Antle (1985) at $50 million annually for the Navigation System as a 
whole. Schreiner, Chantaworn, and Badger (1987) incorporate supply side 
elements into a methodology for planning optimum facility development in a 
multiple purpose water resource project. Results of their analysis yield 
information on optimum timing and level of investment for recreation facility 
development; on total visitor days by time period, and total costs of supplying 
recreation services; and on the distribution of private and social benefits and 
costs. Schreiner, Chantaworn, and Badger applied their methodology to Lake 
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Fort Gibson and their results show that the present value of marginal net 
benefits over the planning period 1975-2000 is about $49.5 million in 1975 
prices if recreationists are charged all of the marginal costs of recreation facility 
development. 
The present study builds upon previous work completed in the McClellan-
Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System. Some of the existent limitations 
pointed out by Schreiner, Chantaworn, and Badger are relaxed. Competition 
between a local lake and a regional lake is introduced into the analysis. 
Likewise, cross price effects on competing demands for recreation are 
considered in the planning model methodology which are estimated using a 
discrete choice travel cost model that has a regional gravity component. 
Diseconomies of size in investment and externalities such as congestion are 
also specified. 
The Investment Decision in Water Projects 
This section is based largely on Randall (1987). River basins frequently 
cross over the boundaries of state and local government jurisdictions. The 
federal government, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction 
over all navigable waters. Randall argues that given the massive size of river 
systems, the massive capital requirements for large-scale river system 
modifications, the tradition of homesteading and the family farm, and the vesting 
of ownership rights to rivers in the public sector, large-scale river modification 
projects must be carried out by the public sector. 
The initial support for a new project or an extension of an existing project 
usually comes from the groups that have been traditional supporters of water 
programs or that feel they can benefit from it. Meanwhile, the federal water-
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resource agency, in this case the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, will have 
prepared several investment plans to meet the needs of the clientele groups. 
From this process a project proposal emerges. Once the local or regional office 
of the agency prepares the project supporting documentation, it needs to 
persuade its headquarters of its advantages to present its project to the U.S. 
Congress for authorization. 
The Congress may approve the project if it is shown that the benefits to 
whomsoever they accrue are greater than the costs. That is, the benefit-cost 
ratio must be greater than one. This criteria was placed in the Flood Control Act 
of 1936 which is identified by many as the origin of benefit-cost analysis in 
federal programs. It is important to note that the Agency proposes and 
evaluates the project itself, according with the guidelines set by the Water 
Resources Council, which is an entity whose members are appointed by the 
president. The Office of Management and Budget, a federal agency, may 
review the consistency of the project evaluation prepared by the Agency. The 
project evaluation may be examined by another federal agency which might 
have interest in its potential impacts. 
The application for the authorization of the project has to go through a 
congressional subcommittee which holds legislative hearings. These hearings 
are open not only to the congressional staff and other government agencies, but 
also to anyone that may have an interest in the project. 
An environmental-impact assessment (EIA) and an environmental-impact 
statement (EIS) must also be prepared and submitted according with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The EIS reports the findings of the 
/ 
evaluation carried out by the EIA which focus on the potential effects that the 
construction and operation of the project would have on the region in which it is 
implemented. The guidelines for preparing the EIS include, among other 
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aspects, the active solicitation of written comments from all interested 
individuals and groups, holding of public hearings, and circulation of the EIA 
draft to all interested parties. The National Environmental Policy Act permits 
litigation to challenge the EIS, but only on procedural or substantive grounds. 
That is, a project may be approved even though it has adverse effects on the 
environment. It is only required that the EIS be complete according to the 
procedures stated in the guidelines. 
Congressional authorization of the Project must be complemented with 
adequate funds approved by Congress. The project cannot be implemented 
without funds allocation so that the congressional hearings concerning funding 
constitute another opportunity to express support or opposition to the project. 
Following the subcommittee approval, the project funds must be approved by 
the Congress and the budget allocation must have the President's consent. If 
the Congress allocates funds to the project, it is necessary to comply with 
additional requirements set by other agencies. Litigation is also possible under 
the Endangered Species Act if the project implementation jeopardizes the 
existence of a specie. 
The state and local government role is not as well defined as the federal 
role in water-related projects. Many water programs require local governments 
to share certain components of the project costs. Moreover, there is a tradition 
of not implementing a project if it is opposed by the state and local government 
where the project will be located. Hence, individuals may influence the 
decision of undertaking the project at the state decision level. 
Under the Reagan Administration the Water Resources Council has been 
abolished, and its regulations regarding benefit-cost analysis have been 
rescinded and replaced by guidelines. On the other hand, the Executive Order 
(EO) 12291 issued by President Reagan in 1981 has set more stringent 
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procedures for benefit-cost analysis for new regulations and for major revisions 
of existing ones. The EO 12291 requires a full consideration of regulatory 
alternatives and a specification of winners and losers. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers prepares a facilities and site 
development plan for each project which is referred to as the Master Plan. It is 
used for purposes of long-term development of the project. 
Problem Statement 
Consider the problem that the policy maker faces in developing a project 
for a recreational site. He needs to determine if it is worthwhile to implement the 
project, and if so, he needs to know the amount and timing of the required 
resources, and what policies can influence private decision makers so that their 
behavior conforms to the desired social objective. 
More specifically, he has to determine the following: 
1) The demand for recreational services for the project. This step is not 
straight forward because the demand cannot be observed directly but must be 
inferred using indirect methods based on the market of a related input or by 
direct elicitation of willingness to pay. Moreover, in the outdoor recreation 
market consumers do not face a unique price, but each consumer faces a 
particular price according to his location with respect to the recreational site. 
Most of the research in the outdoor recreation literature has focused in 
developing methods for measuring the demand and benefits for recreational 
services, which have been useful for project managers in determining 
willingness to pay for developing sites. However, what project managers are 
ultimately more interested in knowing is if a project should be undertaken. 
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2) The average and marginal cost curves in the recreation market. In 
particular, if the average cost turns out to be decreasing over the relevant range, 
then this finding has important implications for the management policies of the 
site. Moreover, externality costs such as congestion may be an important 
variable in determining the optimal social attendance at the site. 
3) The optimal timing for changing capacity at the recreation site. A 
delay in the expansion of current capacity has a positive effect on the 
discounted social benefits but potential benefits are also foregone. 
4) What policies to enact to ration attendance at the recreational site 
given that social costs are higher than the private costs of recreating because 
the visitors do not pay all the costs of developing and maintaining the site. Each 
policy may have significant differences for the investment requirements. For 
example, a non-exclusionary policy will probably result in a considerable need 
for expanding capacity compared with a policy that requires that recreationists 
pay the full cost of developing the facilities. 
5) The cost-sharing rule among the federal government, the state, and/or 
local governments, and the recreationists. This issue is closely related to the 
previous consideration. The cost-sharing rule may affect considerably those 
who must cover the financial needs of the project in a cash flow basis. In 
particular, how adequate is the 50-50 cost-sharing basis of new capital 
expenditures between the federal government and local participation from the 
point of view of the state. 
6) The relevance of substitution effects among sites. The project 
evaluation becomes more complicated if substitution effects are significant. The 
substitution effects may occur because of pricing policies or through changes in 
the characteristics of alternative and competing lakes (sites). 
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Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the research is to propose a more comprehensive 
planning procedure for recreational projects that can be useful to project 
managers in developing a Master Plan. The procedure will not only address 
the question on how much is the willingness to pay for recreational services but 
also to provide the optimal investment allocation and entrance fees for 
competing sites under alternative government policies. Specific objectives 
include: 
1. To reestimate the demand for water-based recreation based on 
survey and secondary data available for five major Oklahoma lakes 
and project recreation demand for Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller. 
2. To estimate the unit costs of operating, maintaining, and expanding 
the water-based recreation facilities at Lakes Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller. 
3. To identify and estimate congestion costs at Lakes Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller. 
4. To incorporate diseconomies of size in the expansion of recreational 
facilities at Lake Tenkiller. 
5. To evaluate alternative policy options for water-based recreation 
management at Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller, with emphasis in 
pricing and budgetary policies, and in cost-sharing rules. 
Application to Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller 
The following factors were considered in choosing Lakes Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller for the application of the planning methodology: 
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1. Only lakes within the Arkansas Navigation System were considered 
since the survey carried out in 1975 focused in these recreation sites. 
2. Fort Gibson and Tenkiller were chosen because the former is a local 
lake and the latter is a regional lake as defined by Schreiner, Willet, 
Badger and Antle. A previous study (Schreiner, Chantaworn, and 
Badger, 1987) applied the planning methodology to Fort Gibson and 
makes possible a comparison of their results with those obtained from 
the current study. 
3. Lake Tenkiller has the largest market area among the lakes 
considered and thus provides the greatest potential for substitution 
among sites. Its market area reaches five states: Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and Texas. 
The following information is taken from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(1978a, 1978b). 
Fort Gibson Dam is located on the Grand (Neosho) River at about five 
miles north of the town of Fort Gibson, Oklahoma, and about 12 miles northeast 
of Muskogee, Oklahoma. The Fort Gibson project was authorized for 
construction by the Flood Control Act of 1941. The project was placed in full 
operation for flood control and the generation of hydroelectrical power in 1953. 
Tenkiller Ferry Lake is located on the Illinois River about 5 miles northeast 
of Gore, 22 miles southeast of Muskogee, Oklahoma and 40 miles northeast of 
Fort Smith, Arkansas. The lake is located in Cherokee and Sequoyah counties 
of Oklahoma. Tenkiller Ferry Dam and Lake was authorized by the Flood 
Control Act of 1938 and later modified in 1946 to provide hydroelectrical power. 
In 1946 this project was incorporated in the multiple-purpose plan for the 
Arkansas River. 
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Plan of Presentation 
The elements of the planning model are presented in Chapter II. The main 
elements of a planning model are first identified and then conceptually 
interrelated. A literature review on welfare concepts, marginal benefit 
estimation, interest rate determination, and marginal cost estimation relevant to 
outdoor recreation is also presented in Chapter II. 
Chapter Ill deals with the reestimation and projection of the demand and 
benefits for water-based recreation activities at five Oklahoma lakes in the 
McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to estimate the price substitution effects among the lakes. 
The estimates and procedures for the cost components of the planning 
model are developed in Chapter IV. 
The investment programming model and its results and validation for the 
base case are derived and reported in Chapter V. 
An analysis of the 50-50 cost-sharing rule for new capital expenditures 
between the federal and local participation is discussed in Chapter VI. 
Chapter VII evaluates pricing and budgetary policies for Lakes Fort Gibson 
and Tenkiller. 
Chapter VIII presents a summary and conclusions of the study. 
Suggestions for further work as well as limitations of the study are pointed out. 
Expected Results 
The planning methodology should provide information useful to project 
managers in preparing their Master Plan and management decision concerning 
investment allocation and entrance fees. More specifically, the following results 
are made available: 
10 
1. Optimum timing and level of facility development for lakes likely to 
have substitution effects. 
2. Total visitor days by time period and their associated benefits and 
costs. 
3. Information on the effects of changing entrance fees. 
4. Analysis of budget allocations across competing lakes. 
CHAPTER II 
ELEMENTS OF A RECREATIONAL PLANNING MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the conceptual 
foundations that identify the elements of a planning model for recreational 
projects. The first section introduces the planning model. The following 
sections examine each of its elements. 
A Conceptual Planning Model 
The planning model assumes that the federal, state, and local 
governments share the same objective and therefore behave as if they were a 
single entity where the objective is to maximize social welfare from a national 
viewpoint. This assumption will be relaxed in Chapter VI. 
The policy question to be addressed is the joint determination of the 
optimal investment path and entrance fees for Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller 
such that social welfare is maximized. 
Figure 1 presents the static demand and supply functions for the two lakes 
in a hypothetical case for expository purposes. In the upper left graph, the 
recreation market for lake 1 is depicted. The private supply (SP1) includes the 
private costs of recreation such as travel and time costs. The social supply 
(SS1) contains both the private costs and costs not paid by recreationists such 
as operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, investment costs, and negative 
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the unconstrained private VDAYp (visitor days) and social VDAYs equilibrium. 
Note that the ss1 has a discrete jump at the recreation capacity level VDAY C· 
The figure below the graph of the market for lake 1 shows investment and 
marginal private net benefit functions. The investment function is zero at levels 
of visitor days below the recreation capacity VDAY c and positive and increasing 
at a decreasing rate at levels above the recreation capacity. The marginal net 
private benefit function decreases at an increasing rate and goes to zero at 
equilibrium VDAYp. The lower graph depicts the relationship between the 
investment function and the real interest rate. The demand for investment in 
recreation at lake 1 decreases as the real interest rate increases. 
If the project manager does not set an entry fee for lake 1, then the 
equilibrium, assuming that investment is carried out instantaneously, will be 
given by VDAYt. Note that the feasible set for equilibrium points such as VDAYt 
depends on factors such as the capacity constraint, the marginal net private 
benefit and costs, and the interest rate since it may limit the level of investment. 
To complicate things further, if the project manager decides to set entry fee at 
P1 - P2 to enforce the optimal social equilibrium VDAY 8 , then the demand 
schedule may rotate multiplicatively if we consider price substitution effects due 
to the presence of the recreation market for lake 2. Hence, the solution cannot 
be easily determined a priori without using some kind of empirical technique. In 
Chapter V a multiperiod mathematical programming model is presented that 
incorporates the principal elements of the recreation market. 
This framework suggests that the following constitute elements for a 
planning model, where data and/or further modelling are needed: 
Estimates of the marginal productivity of investment for each lake. 
These estimates include the productivity of the lake characteristics - i.e., water 
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quality, scenic beauty - as well as the recreational facilities that can be 
implemented. 
Estimates of the marginal welfare benefits. Research in the outdoor 
recreation subdiscipline has focused mainly in this area. A discussion of the 
several ways of estimating these benefits with emphasis on the travel cost 
method (TCM) is presented below. 
Estimates of the marginal cost of providing recreational services at 
each lake. 
An estimate of the real interest rate. 
Entrance fee policies. 
Cost Sharing rules. 
Social Welfare 
A benchmark is needed for purposes of comparison with alternative 
specifications of policies in the water-based recreation market. This benchmark 
is usually defined as some measure of social welfare. The following welfare 
concepts are defined and discussed: Marshallian consumer surplus, 
compensating variation, equivalent variation, compensating surplus, and 
equivalent surplus. 
The Marshallian consumer surplus is defined as the difference between 
the amount consumers are willing to pay and what they actually pay with a 
constant price per unit. The maximum willingness to pay for a good is 
measured by the demand curve. Unfortunately, the consumer surplus is not a 
good approximation of individual welfare since money income is held constant 
instead of the utility level. The use of consumer surplus is correct if the marginal 
utility of income is constant, which is unlikely to occur in real world applications. 
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Hicks (1943) defined four welfare measures to maintain utility constant at all 
points of the demand curve which are defined as follows for the case of a price 
decrease. 
Compensating Variation (CV):. the amount of compensation that must be 
taken from an individual to leave him at the same level of satisfaction as before 
the change. 
Equivalent Variation (EV): the amount of compensation that must be given 
to an individual, in the absence of the change, to permit him to obtain the same 
level of satisfaction as before the change. 
Compensating Surplus (CS): the amount of compensation that must be 
taken from an individual, leaving him just as well off as before the change if he 
were constrained to purchase at the new price the quantity of the good he 
would buy in absence of compensation. 
Equivalent Surplus (ES): the amount of compensation that must be given 
to an individual, in the absence of the change, to make him as well off as he 
would be with the change if he were constrained to buy at the old price the 
quantity of the commodity he would actually buy with the new price in the 
absence of compensation. 
The welfare measures differ mainly because the ES and the EV are not 
bounded by an individual's income constraint, whereas the CS and CV are. 
That is, they are based on different frames of reference. 
The last two measures can be interpreted as measures of change of total 
welfare related with a quantity change (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 1982). These 
measures can be more relevant in some applications of environmental policies 
as opposed to welfare measures based on price variations (CV and EV) since 
these kind of resources are not exchanged in the private markets (Randall and 
Stoll, 1980). 
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For practical applications, it is worth noting that the ordinary consumer 
surplus is a good approximation of the compensated consumer surplus under 
certain general conditions as Willig (1976) has shown for the CV and EV cases 
and Randall and Stoll (1980) for the CS and ES cases. For example, if the 
price change for a good is small and the share of the budget spent on the good 
is also small, the change in disposable income is probably small so that 
ordinary consumer surplus is a good approximation of the Hicksian measures of 
welfare. However, it is important to be aware of the possible limitations of these 
approximations when dealing with quality changes instead of price changes 
(Hanemann, 1982). For example, Smith et. al. (1986b) report large differences 
in Marshallian and Hicksian measures of water quality change for twenty-two 
Army Corps of Engineers projects. 
Although still not widely used, economists have developed several 
approaches to calculate Hicksian or "exact" measures of welfare using the 
same information required to estimate ordinary demand functions (Jorgenson 
and Lau, 1975; Hausman, 1981; Vartia, 1983). 
Marginal Benefit Estimation: The Travel Cost Model 
The objective of this section is to present the travel cost model and discuss 
the theoretical and empirical alternatives of considering substitution effects 
among lakes in order to estimate the marginal benefits of recreation. The 
marginal benefits per lake must be estimated since they are needed in the 
planning framework derived above. The travel cost model has been chosen 
because of data availability and also because it was previously used in the 
recreation demand estimation for Lakes Tenkiller and Fort Gibson. The travel 
cost model (TCM) is one of the three more common methods for valuing non-
17 
market goods such as outdoor recreation. The other approaches are the 
contingent ranking approach and the contingent valuation approach. See 
Smith and Desvousges (1986) and Mitchell and Carson (1988) for a 
presentation of the latter methods. 
The TCM is an indirect approach for measuring households valuation of 
outdoor recreation. It is indirect in the sense that it uses data on marketed 
inputs needed for the provision of the final flow of service. The following 
theoretical outline of the TCM follows Smith and Desvousges (1986) and 
Rosenthal (1985, 1987), which in tum have followed Freeman (1979), Maler 
(1974), and Randall (1984). 
The theoretical justification of the TCM can be obtained from the 
expenditure function approach. The expenditure function is defined as 
indicating the least amount of money an individual would need to achieve a 
particular level of utility at given prices (Varian, 1984). In this case, 
(2.1) 
where E(.) is the expenditure function, Yj is the recreational experience at lake j, 
Pj is the price of the recreational experience at lake j, and U0 is the given level 
of utility. 
Taking the partial derivatives of (2.1) with respect to Y 1 and Y 2 gives as 
results the Hicksian compensated demand functions for the recreation activities 
on lakes Y 1 and Y 2· 
Randall (1984) identifies three sets of valuation techniques that can be 
used within the expenditure function approach. These are the weak 
complementarity, perfect substitution, and hedonic prices techniques. The TCM 
is based on the weak complementarity technique. This procedure has its 
foundation in the weak complementary assumption (Maler, 1974). Weak 
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complementary between a marketed good Zj and nonmarketed good Yj is 
defined as 
(2.2) 
This assumption implies that when consumption of the market good Zj is 
zero, then the individual utility does not show any variation derived from 
changes in the nonmarket good Yj. Hence, this assumption enables the 
estimation of the demand for final service flow such as outdoor recreation at 
lakes from the observed behavior on the market of its inputs such as travel costs 
and the opportunity cost of time. 
The weak complementary assumption implies that the TCM cannot take 
into account the nonuse values (Krutilla, 1967). One of the components of 
nonuse values is the recognition that the welfare of some individuals could 
increase just by being aware of the existence of an environmental benefit 
without necessarily expecting to visit it in the future. Therefore, enhancing the 
utility of an individual may not require observable acts of use of the resources 
involved. 
The theoretical foundations of the TCM is shown by Bowes and Loomis 
* (1980). Let Y j represent removal of the recreation facilities at the jth lake. 
Therefore, the welfare loss as measured by the compensating variation criteria 
of removing Yj is given by: 
(2.3) 
Likewise, the welfare loss associated with increasing the entrance fee and 
travel costs to p* such that the quantity demanded is driven to zero is 
CS(T) = E(P*,Yj)- E(P,Yj) (2.4) 
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where T stands for the travel activity carried out by households and CS stands 
for consumer surplus. 
Since the weak complementarity assumption implies that 
.. * * E(P ,Yj)- E(P ,Yj) = 0 (2.5) 
The following relation is obtained from (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5) 
CS(Yj) = CS(T)- [E(P*,Yj)- E(P,Yj)] (2.6) 
The last term of (2.6) is the consumer surplus derived from nonexistent 
recreational facilities, which can be assumed to be zero. Hence, CS(Yj) = 
CS(T), which proves the theoretical soundness of the TCM. Note that if the last 
term of (2.6) is zero, then this relationship coupled with (2.5) implies that the 
weak complementarity assumption holds from Yj to Zj as well as from Zj to Yj. 
That is, the consumer surplus measure for the elimination of either good is 
always equal. 
Some researchers (Smith and Krutilla, 1982) have argued that the weak 
complementarity assumption is not required for the TCM. They focus on the 
supply side of outdoor recreation by stating that, for example, it is possible to 
derive the benefits of nonmarketed goods from the technical relationships 
between marketed and nonmarketed goods. That is, the availability of a 
nonmarketed good is associated with a marketed good, so it is not necessary to 
appeal to preference structures to specify the linkage between them. 
One of the limitations of the expenditure function approach applied to the 
TCM is that, as Malar (1974) has stated, the integrability conditions of the 
estimated demand functions may not be satisfied, violating an assumption of the 
expenditure function method. Most of the common functional forms used in 
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empirical estimation such as the linear, quadratic, or common log 
transformations do not satisfy these conditions. 
The TCM can be framed using a household production function approach 
(Becker, 1965). This approach can be described in a variety of ways such as in 
McConnell (1985), Deyak and Smith (1978), Bockstael and McConnell (1981, 
1983). The basic idea is that households are both producers and consumers of 
services. They buy marketed goods to be combined with their own resources 
such as time to produce final flow services such that households' utility is 
enhanced. The TCM is a special case of the household production function 
(HPF) approach, where the households produce a recreation service flow. An 
advantage of using the HPF is that it provides a theoretical basis to include 
substitution effects among sites. Moreover, this property allows the 
incorporation of the characteristics of the sites on the recreation demand 
estimates. This feature could be quite useful for considering the linkages 
between investment - which changes the sites characteristics - and the 
demand for outdoor recreation. The HPF approach consists of two steps. In the 
first step, households minimize their costs of each possible set of final service 
flows after considering combinations of market goods and time to produce those 
service flows. That is, a set of shadow prices of producing each final service 
flow is determined. In the second step, households maximize their utility subject 
to income and time constraints by selecting the mix of final service flows. 
Maler (1985) claims that in using HPF theory it is not possible to estimate 
the demand for marginal willingness to pay for environmental products. Some 
a priori assumptions on the HPF are needed. In particular, as Pollak and 
Wachter (1975) have shown, the production function has to exhibit constant 
returns to scale and no joint production. In the HPF, these conditions are 
generally not met. It is necessary to assume either that quality per trip is 
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exogenous or to use instead factor demands (Bocksteal and McConnell, 1983). 
Moreover, they showed that the HPF technique does not yield any new 
empirically testable hypothesis. However, as Smith and Desvousges (1986) 
assert, the HPF does not change the final form of the demand function, but it 
does help to understand the important assumptions that underlie the function 
which yields valuable qualitative insights. 
The appropriate treatment of substitution effects in outdoor recreation has 
generated considerable literature ·but still substantial debate remains on 
incorporating these effects in estimation procedures (Rosenthal, 1987). The 
following approaches have been developed which follow the classification in 
Rosenthal (1985), Mendelsohn and Brown (1983), and Smith and Desvousges 
(1986) but with some modifications: own price only TCM; quality enhanced own 
price only TCM; classical travel cost models; incorporation of an index of 
relative attractiveness of other recreation sites; and discrete choice TCM. 
Own Prjce Only TCM 
The own price only TCM has been the most widely applied method. It is 
generally justified in estimating benefits from sites that are rather unique. 
However, when applied to sites that are common, substitution effects may 
become more important. Public agencies are becoming aware of the potential 
bias of not considering substitution effects in measuring benefits as in the case 
reported by Rosenthal {1985) where the U.S. Forest Service Planning Office 
lowered the values reported by published research by as much as fifty percent 
before using them. In own price only TCM the dependent variable is usually 
some measure of quantity of visits and the independent variables include, in 
22 
addition to the cost of travel and time in reaching the site, such factors as 
income and population but do not include substitute sites. 
The effect of omitting substitute prices can affect the parameter estimates in 
two ways: (1) econometric specification bias and (2) failure to identify a perfect 
substitute site. The effect of left-out variables in econometric estimation is well 
known (Theil, 1956; Griliches, 1957). The amount of bias on the included 
variable depends on the true sign of the left out variable and on the sign of the 
correlation between the included variable and the left-out variable. If we expect 
that the sign of the left-out variable and its correlation with the included variable 
to be the same, then the included variable has positive bias. Since it is 
expected that the prices between lakes are positively correlated and that the 
sign of the omitted substitution lake to be positive, then the own price only TCM 
may exhibit positive bias in its estimation. The extent of the bias depends on 
the particular case study. 
The failure to identify a perfect substitute site on the estimation benefits 
could overstate the consumer surplus if the price of a trip to a perfect substitute 
price is less than the price that drives quantity demanded to zero. That is, the 
demand becomes perfectly elastic at the price level of the perfect substitute 
price. Rosenthal (1987) found that the without substitute model gives values for 
the consumer surplus per trip that are significantly higher than the other two 
methods he considered. He also concludes that no general.statement can be 
made since the amount of the difference depends on the site being studied. 
Quality Enhanced Own Price Only TCM 
This approach assumes a specific form for a function that incorporates site 
attributes in the recreationists' utility function. Therefore, site selection is 
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assumed to respond to utility-maximizing selections of these attributes (Smith 
and Desvousges, 1986). The functional form allows all parameters of the utility 
function to be recovered from the estimated equations. The advantage of this 
approach is that if the model is specified with an indirect utility function, then it is 
possible to derive demand as functions of the implicit prices, site attributes, and 
income. Unfortunately, this approach requires a substantial number of 
observations at each site and a substantial number of sites. Smith and 
Desvousges (1986) propose the use of the simple repackaging hypothesis 
introduced by Fisher and Shell (1968) to lower the data requirements in 
empirical applications. This hypothesis implies that if the contributions of each 
characteristic to the productivity of the site can be restricted to a specific form 
defined as the repackaging hypothesis, then the measurement of the sites 
characteristics as determinant of site demand will provide an explanation for the 
substitution. Therefore, after adjusting for their attributes, all sites are perfect 
substitutes for each other. 
These restrictions allow the representation of the services of a different 
recreation site by a single scale or index. 
Following Smith and Desvousges (1986), the definition for the scaled 
index is 
vs = J(aj) * Vj (2.23) 
where vs stands for scaled services, Vj stands for specific site's services and 
J(aj) is an augmentation function that has as arguments a vector ai that 
represents the characteristics of the site. The augmentation function describes 
how sites would substitute for each other in the production of a final service 
flow. The Smith and Desvousges model also assumes that only one site will be 
selected. Therefore, the households' cost function will be a function of the site's 
attributes, which justifies the use of the augmentation function as an index for 
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correcting the travel costs and opportunity cost of time. Moreover, it guarantees 
that changes in site characteristics affects the observed changes in the 
demands for recreation sites. This feature justifies the specification of an 
econometric procedure based on use of a two-stage varying parameters model, 
where visits are regressed first on the travel and time costs and other demand 
shifters- with the exception of implicit prices of substitute sites- and then in the 
second step each of the estimated parameters is regressed on the site's 
characteristics. Substitute prices can be dropped from the specification since 
these effects are taken into account by using the index. 
Classjcal Travel Cost Models 
Classical TCM includes substitution measures in the demand curve. 
Numerous applications have been carried out within this framework. The paper 
by Burt and Brewer (1971) is a classic work representing these models. 
Their model can be formulated as 
(2.7) 
where: 
Vij = visits per household from origin ito site j; 
Pij = price of traveling from origin ito site j; 
Pik = price of traveling from origin i to substitute site k; 
a, b, c = parameters to be estimated. 
By taking into account the cross-price effects, equation (2.7) overcomes the 
econometric bias of the own price only TCM. Burt and Brewer (1971) 
introduced a simplifying assumption, namely, that perfect substitution holds 
among lakes within a given class of site. This simplification implies that for a 
given class of site, individuals will always visit the one with the minimum travel 
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cost. This assumption allowed them to set an upper bound of integration for the 
computation of the net benefits and also to diminish the number of cross-price 
terms that need to be considered. 
TCM wjth Indexes of Relative Attractiveness 
This approach incorporates an index of relative attractiveness and 
availability of other recreation sites into the site's demand equation (Knetsh et. 
al., 1976; Talhem, 1978). 
This approach has intuitive appeal since it can capture a negative 
relationship between visits to site i and the attractiveness of other sites as 
reflected by the index. Moreover, the changes on quality can be represented by 
the index (Rosenthal, 1985). However, this method is considered by Smith and 
Desvousges as the least desirable since the index is arbitrarily constructed. 
That is, the definition of the index implies a knowledge of the substitution 
relationships which presupposes the same information it tries to derive. 
Rosenthal (1985) shows by using the Burt and Brewer (1971) framework that 
this approach is pointless if the objective is to estimate the value of an existing 
recreation site since higher quality sites can be expected to have larger 
estimated parameters in the econometric demand equation. That is, separate 
price terms avoid the need to construct an index since the effects of both price 
and quality on substitution are already embodied in those price terms. On the 
other hand, if the objective is to determine the effect of changing quality on 
benefits at an existing site then the use of an index is a valid method to valuing 
quality, but still an inferior method since its definition remains arbitrary. 
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Discrete Choice Travel Cost Models 
Discrete choice recreational demand models have recently been 
developed that incorporate substitution effects influencing recreationists' 
choices of where and how often to recreate (Caulkins et. al., 1986; Morey 
(1981 ); Hanemann (1982); Rosenthal (1985 and 1987). These models are both 
multi-site and multi-attribute TCM. The model is based on the assumption that 
households make two separate decisions leading to visitation at a lake. The 
first choice is whether or not an individual will undertake a recreational activity 
on a particular day given that the individual is among the lake recreation user 
population. The second choice is which site to visit given that the choice of 
visiting a lake has been made. Therefore, as Small and Rosen (1981) have 
shown, it is possible to represent a demand function as the product of two 
separate functions. 
Caulkins et. al. (1986) use the laws of conditional probability to represent 
demand as follows 
Pg ni = Pilg * Pglr (2.8) 
where Pg ni is the joint probability of choosing to take a trip to a lake and 
choosing lake i from the choice set; Pilg is the conditional probability of 
choosing lake i from the choice set given that one has decided to take a trip to a 
lake; and Pglr is the probability of choosing lake recreation on a particular day 
given that one participates in lake recreation. 
A variation on these models is to specify a gravity model to determine the 
level and distribution of trips across sites (Sutherland, 1982a, b; Rosenthal, 
1985 and 1987). Following Rosenthal (1987}, the number of trips from the 
origin to a recreation site is represented as 
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(2.9) 
where Tij is the number of trips from origin i to recreation site j; Ti is the total 
number of recreation trips from origin i; and Pij is the probability that a trip from 
origin i will have j as its destination. That is, the gravity model consists of a trip 
generation function (Ti) and a trip distribution function (Pij). Rosenthal estimated 
the trip distribution function with a multinomial legit model whereas the trip 
generation function was estimated using log-linear regression and maximum 
likelihood logistic regression. 
Some of the advantages of using this approach include (1) perfect 
substitution assumption need not be made; (2) several problems associated 
with zero observations are handled such as nonnormality of errors, 
heteroskedasticity, and taking the logarithm of zero; and (3) it can be related 
within a choice theoretic framework. 
Chapter Ill presents a discrete choice TCM with a gravity model for the 
estimation of recreational experiences at the major lakes in Oklahoma. 
So far we have outlined the different approaches to estimating the 
recreation demand functions . It remains to discuss the other components 
outlined in the conceptual introduction, namely, the interest rate and the 
marginal costs of outdoor recreation facilities at each lake. 
Interest Rate Determination in Public Sector Investment 
This topic is still a controversial one among economists. The following 
approaches have dealt with the theoretical determination of the interest rate: 
the social time preference rate; the opportunity cost of displaced private 
investment; and the before tax rate of return on corporate investments (Young 
and Haveman, 1985). 
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In 1968, the Water Resources Council stated that the formula to compute 
the discount rate on federal water resources investment was to be based on the 
yield rate for long-term government bonds. Although this yield has 
approximated the real opportunity cost of displaced private spending, its 
conceptual foundation does not appeal to economists since it is based on the 
nominal cost to government of borrowing (Young and Haveman, 1985). The 
government borrowing rate is appropriate only when there is a complete 
segmentation of capital markets, so that no government funds are withdrawn 
from private investment projects with higher rates of return. 
An important issue is whether to use a social interest rate different from the 
private interest rate. If the capital market is perfectly competitive, then the 
government should use the market rate of interest as its discount rate in 
evaluating public investment programs. However, some of the arguments put 
forward against using this criteria are that the private sector is more risk averse 
than the public sector; the existence of a corporation income tax that distorts the 
free market interest rate; the market rate of interest may not take into account 
society's concern for consumption by future generations; and, finally, the market 
interest rates change considerably with the business cycle and it does not seem 
proper to make investment decisions based on rates which fluctuate according 
with macroeconomic conditions. 
Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (1982) contrast the decision on the appropriate 
interest rate to the determination of income distribution. In the latter, one 
compares income distribution among groups within the same generation, 
whereas in the former one compares income accruing to different generations. 
Hence, the appropriate social interest rate ultimately is a value judgement 
similar to the appropriate income distribution. They report that real rates of 
-
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social discount used in the literature fall in the range between zero and four 
percent; whereas nominal rates vary from eight to sixteen percent. 
Marginal Cost of Outdoor Recreation 
Outdoor recreation has been considered as a mixed or public good by 
several authors. Some of the recreational activities carried out at the lakes 
under study are nonrival such as the enjoyment of scenic beauty. That is, 
consumption of scenic beauty by an individual does not reduce the amount 
available for another recreationist. On the other hand, some activities such as 
camping may become rival if the facilities become congested. Another 
characteristic of recreation supply is that the marginal costs are shared by the 
operator and the recreationists with private recreationist costs a nonnegligible 
part of total costs. 
Since the lakes under study are managed by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, it is possible to design a rationing system by turning the 
consumption of recreational services exclusionary through charging 
appropriate entrance fees or through setting quantitative quotas on visitor days 
at each lake. However, the implicit policy has been to offer nonexclusionary 
recreational services (Harrington, 1987) by charging nominal entrance fees and 
by not setting any kind of quota. Therefore, the attendance at each lake is 
rationed only by private costs of recreation and externalities such as congestion 
costs. 
Harrington (1987) discusses the aggregate recreation supply with 
emphasis on travel and congestion costs. He shows that in a spatial model with 
many communities and many recreation sites an equilibrium is obtained in 
which the attendance from each community is determined by the sum of 
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congestion and travel costs. For any given community this sum, which turns out 
to be the price of recreating for that community, is the same for all sites. 
Otherwise, the community is priced out from a given site. He noted that there is 
no single price but a different price for each location in space. 
Another issue is whether the marginal cost function is upward sloping. In 
the short run, where site inputs are held constant, marginal social cost is 
increasing since private costs vary positively with distance and congestion costs 
are an increasing function of the number of participants. In the long run, there 
may be some special cases that exhibit constant or decreasing costs 
(Harrington, 1987). However, these are unlikely to occur for recreation at 
Oklahoma Lakes since in the long run there is at least one input that remains 
fixed, which is the amount of available land at a recreation site. Estimates of the 
long run marginal costs for Tenkiller Lake are presented in Chapter IV and 
show that investment costs are increasing. 
CHAPTER Ill 
DEMAND AND BENEFIT ESTIMATION 
The objective of this chapter is to reestimate the demand for water-based 
recreation activities at five Oklahoma lakes in the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas 
River Navigation System. The purpose is to incorporate substitution effects 
among the lakes for use in the investment planning model presented in Chapter 
5. Schreiner et. al. (1985) previously estimated demand using the own price 
travel cost method (TCM) which does not include substitution effects. The 
principle policy variables considered in this study-entrance fees and 
investment allocation for lakes Ft. Gibson and Tenkiller-make it necessary to 
develop a procedure that incorporates substitution effects across recreational 
sites. These substitution effects come about through cross-price elasticity 
effects and through changes in the recreation facilities provided that affect 
quality of the recreational experience. 
The Demand Model 
The procedure chosen for demand estimation is a regional gravity model 
that incorporates a Discrete Choice TCM in the trip distribution function 
(Sutherland, 1982a and 1982b; Cesario and Knetsh, 1976; Rosenthal, 1985 
and 1987). The total visitor-days from county i to lake j is modeled as the 
product of two separate terms: 
T·-T* p .. I,J- I I,J 
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where Ti,j is total visitor days from county i to lake j; Ti = ~ Ti,j; and Pi,j is the 
J 
probability that county i attends lake j. 
The term Ti is modeled using a trip generation function whereas the term 
Pi,j represents a trip distribution function. The theoretical justification for 
separating the demands of a good into the product of two separate functions is 
found in Small and Rosen (1981 ). The product of these functions is the 
expected demand. The term Pi,j is estimated using the multinomial logit model 
proposed by McFadden (1973, 1976). The multinomial logit model is defined 
as 
exp[f(B,Xi,j)] 
Pi,j = I, exp[f(B,Xi k)] 
k ' 
i = 1 , .. ,N 
k=j=1, .. ,J 
(3.1) 
where exp is the natural number e and f is a function of a parameter vector B 
and regressors X. Observe that the predicted probabilities always lie between 
zero and one. 
The term Ti is estimated as the product of two functions, 
Ti = [~ Ti,j I Ti > 0] * [Pi > 0] (3.2) 
J 
The first function of (3.2) determines the level of visitor days generated at 
county i given that the county registered positive visitor-days. The second 
function is the probability that county i was sampled at any of the lakes in the 
survey. 
Equation (3.1) is estimated using weighted least squares, where f is 
specified as a linear function. Let j and m be alternative lakes, then from (3.1) 
P i,j exp[(B'Xi,j)] 
Pi,m = exp[(B'Xi,mH 
and taking logs to both sides results in 
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p .. 
In p.1'1 = 8' (Xi 1· - Xi m) + e i l,m . I I (3.3) 
where e i is the error term. Equation (3.3) is readily amenable for estimation 
using weighted least squares. Note that the dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the probability of choosing alternative j over m. Therefore, it is no longer 
required that the predicted values of the dependent variable lie between zero 
and one but can lie on the entire real line. 
An important property of the multinomial logit model (MNL) as shown by 
McFadden (1973) is that the model can be derived from utility maximization. 
The MNL is derived from utility maximization if and only if the error term in the 
stochastic individual utilities are independent and their distribution is given by a 
Type I extreme value distribution. This distribution is also known as the log 
Weibull distribution. 
Another important feature of the MNL is the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives property (IIA). This means that the probability of j being chosen 
over m is independent from the availability or attributes of alternatives other 
than j and m. An implication of the IIA property is that the cross-elasticity of the 
probability of response m with respect to variable Xi,j is the same for all m -:~= j. 
The IIA property constitutes both an advantage and a disadvantage. The 
advantage is that the parameter vector 8 is constant for all alternatives making 
the model useful in predicting the demand for a new recreational site. The 
disadvantage is that the property is not plausible if the alternatives are similar 
since it is likely that the probabilities between alternatives j and m will change 
with the introduction of a similar alternative. Using the Domencich and 
McFadden (1975) example, if the alternatives for a model of transportation 
consist of car, red bus, and blue bus, instead of car, bus, and train, then the IIA 
property is an unreasonable assumption since the utility level for using a red 
34 
bus is highly correlated with the utility level of riding in a blue bus. Hence, the 
probability of j being chosen over m depends on alternatives other than j and m. 
Notice also that regressors common to all alternatives should be dropped 
from (3.3). Even the constant term should be dropped from the specification, but 
Amemiya (1981) suggests keeping the constant term since the fit is generally 
better. This specification implies that the utilities depend on the lake 
characteristics, which is in line with the hedonic demand models discussed by 
Lancaster (1966). 
For a detailed discussion of the theoretical properties of the multinomial 
legit model see McFadden (1973, 1976, 1982) and Domencich and McFadden 
(1975). 
The observed probabilities are estimated from grouped data, assuming 
that each of the error terms of the individual observations in a group is 
independent and follows a multinomial probability distribution which 
approximates a normal distribution in large samples. Since the error term in 
equation (3.3) is heteroscedastic (Theil, 1970; Pyndick and Rubinfeld, 1981) the 
data are weighted by 
[1N(i,j)]·5 
where V(i,j) is the variance of the error term given by 
V(" ") ni 1 ,J = r· · * ( n · - r· ·) I ,J I I ,J 
where ni is the total visitor days originated from county i and n,j is the total visitor 
days from county i to lake j. 
The predicted values need to be renormalized into probabilities. The 
restriction that the sum of the probabilities must equal one is used to compute 
the predicted probabilities. An alternative way to compute the predicted 
probabilities is by substituting the estimated parameter vector B in (3.1 ). 
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The weighted least squares method of estimating the multinomial model 
results in consistent estimators. But if the sample is large and the selection 
probabilities are distributed very unevenly among the different alternatives, 
maximum likelihood yields better estimators than least squares using grouped 
data. Accessibility of the appropriate software for maximum likelihood 
estimation limited the author to that of estimation by weighted least squares for 
the multinomial log it model in equation (3.1 ). 
The first function of equation (3.2) is estimated using weighted loglinear 
regression to correct for heteroscedasticity. The predicted values of the total 
visitor days are corrected for the bias present in the constant term (Goldberger, 
1968, Kennedy, 1983). This bias results in overprediction of the dependent 
variable, which may be sizable in simulation studies that predict outside the 
range of the data set. The procedure presented by Kennedy is used to correct 
for bias and results in the following estimator 
* A2 
T i = Ti exp [.5 a - .5V(i)] 
* where Ti is the predicted value from the loglinear regression, T i is the corrected 
A2 
value, a is the estimated variance of the regression, and V(i) is the estimate of 
the variance of the predicted value. V(i) is given by 
A2 -1 
V(i) = a Xo' (X'X) Xo 
where Xo is the specific value of X corresponding to the Ti to be forecast, and 
(X'Xf1 is the estimated variance-covariance matrix. 
The second function of (3.2) is estimated using a binomial logit 
specification, where the dependent variable takes the value of one if the county 
is observed and zero otherwise. The maximum likelihood method is used to 
obtain estimators of the binomiallogit function. The algorithm used to compute 
the estimates is the Newton-Raphson method. 
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One important property of the demand function proposed is that it meets 
the integrability conditions which must hold in the specification of the 
mathematical programming model presented in Chapter 5 (Hotelling, 1938; 
Silberberg, 1978). Failure to meet this condition will result in an ambiguous 
welfare ranking of the multisites alternatives when many prices are assumed to 
change simultaneously. The necessary and sufficient conditions needed to 
fulfill the integrability condition is that the Slutzky cross price slopes must be the 
same. Neuberger (1971) showed that the integrability condition implies that the 
income elasticities of demand for all sites are equal for each observation. He 
also showed that this condition holds for the logit function. Hence, the primal-
dual linear programming approach for dealing with the integrability condition 
which endogeneizes price changes (Varon, Plessner, and Heady, 1969; Dulay 
and Norton, 1975; Willet, 1983) presented in Chapter 5 results in a meaningful 
social welfare since the demand equations meet the integrability conditions. 
Data 
Data on visitor days were obtained from the survey carried out by 
Oklahoma State University in 1975 at the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River 
Navigation System (Badger, Schreiner, Presley, 1977). The Oklahoma lakes in 
the survey were Eufaula, Ft. Gibson, Keystone, Oolagah, and Tenkiller. 
The purpose of the research is to analyze the investment path and price 
policies for a local lake (Fort Gibson) and a regional lake (Tenkiller), as defined 
by Schreiner et. al. (1985). Counties comprising the market area for Tenkiller 
are used as observations. Because the market area for Ft. Gibson is a subset of 
the market area for Tenkiller, no additional observations are needed in 
estimating the cross-price effects. An assumption imposed with the current data 
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set is that all individuals aggregated within a county observation have the same 
utility function. Table I presents the observed visitor days by county and lake. 
Data on lake characteristics were obtained from each lake's Master Plan 
prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These data are presented in 
Table II and include miles of shoreline, number of campsites, number of public-
use areas, water surface area, and land area. Data on characteristics of water 
quality such as dissolved oxygen, which have been identified as important 
variables in other studies (Smith, Desvousges, and Fischer, 1986), were not 
available for the Oklahoma lakes. 
Data on income per capita by county for 1975 were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1981 ). Data on 
population by county were obtained from the Oklahoma Employment Security 
Commission (1976). Data on travel costs were derived from Schreiner et. al. 
(1985). The maximum observed travel cost for a given lake was assumed for 
those counties with missing data. Unfortunately, the time costs data were highly 
correlated with travel costs and thus were excluded. Appendixes A, 8, and C 
display the data used in the estimation procedure. 
Results 
The final form of equation (3.3) is 
Pj 
In Pm = 81 + 82 [lnCSj - lnCSm] + 83[lnTCj - lnTCm] + e i (3.4) 
where CS is number of campsites and TC are travel costs to a given lake. The 
subscript i for county (observation) has been dropped for convenience. 
The logarithmic specification of the independent variables gives a better fit 
to the equation compared with the data untransformed which confirms previous 
TABLE I 
OBSERVED VISITOR DAYS BY LAKE AND COUNTY 
FROM SAMPLE SURVEY, 1975 
LAKE 
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OK 4 20 24 
OK 69 69 
OK 32 20 39 91 
OK 40 40 
OK 4 65 204 15 266 554 
OK 8 8 
OK 20 20 
OK 23 23 
OK 20 28 48 
OK 19 19 
OK 24 25 49 
OK 6 20 56 82 
OK 24 56 80 
OK 282 15 297 
OK 8 21 10 39 
OK 28 234 57 319 
OK 8 6 14 
OK 5 5 
OK 77 77 
OK 863 68 80 61 761 1,833 
OK 200 6 14 54 274 
OK 25 4 42 16 87 
OK 10 10 
OK 6 103 16 125 
OK 307 3 310 
OK 54 54 
OK 315 87 402 
OK 6 131 2 80 219 
OK 15 6 44 65 
OK 135 135 
OK 80 1,099 771 364 645 2,959 
OK 35 10 30 75 
OK 18 5 92 35 150 
AR 16 16 
AR 66 66 
AR 9 183 192 
AR __Aa __Aa 
2,408 1,794 1,259 694 2,723 8,878 
Badger, Daniel D., Dean F. Schreiner, and Ronald W. Presley. Analysis of 
Expenditures for Outdoor Recreation at the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas Bjyer 
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findings (Amemiya, 1981 ). It means that individuals react less proportionally to 
a given stimulus, i.e., twice as far is not twice as bad. 
The empirical result of equation (3.4) is 
In ;i = .788 + .919 [lnCSj- lnCSm]- 1.217 [lnTCj -lnTCm] 
m . 
(3.5) 
(6.88) (4.171) (-14.733) 
where the numbers in parenthesis are t values and the number of observations 
is 148. 
The Pseudo R2 (Maddala, 1983) is .631. The Likelihood Ratio Test 
(Mendenfall, Sheaffer, Wackerly, 1981) is 184.55, which implies that the null 
hypothesis (i.e., the slope parameters are zero) is rejected at the one percent 
significance level. 
Furthermore, the individual estimates are significant at the 1 percent 
probability level. The expected signs are obtained for the slope parameters. An 
increase of one unit in the difference of the logarithms of campsites between j 
over m increases the logarithm of the probability of favoring alternative j by .919. 
Likewise, an increase of one unit in the difference of the logarithms of travel 
costs between j and m decreases the logarithm of the probability of favoring 
alternative j by 1.217. 
The campsite variable is interpreted as a proxy variable for quality of 
recreation. The addition of lake characteristics other than campsites did not 
improve the estimates and resulted in a loss of statistical efficiency. Although 
investment in campsites improves the quality of the lake by providing facilities, it 
is likely that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers invest in those sites where 
quality perceived by recreationists is the highest. 
Observe that the price and campsite coefficients are the same for all lakes. 
That is, the quality effect has been factored out from the price effect. Some 
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alternative methodologies result in estimates for the price coefficient that 
include differences in quality among alternatives. 
Equation (3.5) allows the estimation of the predicted probabilities for the 
unobserved counties. Tables Ill and IV present the observed and predicted 
probabilities that county i attends lake j. For the purposes of computing the 
dependent variable in equation (3.5), the zero observed probabilities were 
adjusted arbitrarily to .01 preserving the restriction that the sum of the observed 
probabilities equals one. 
The loglinear regression part of equation (3.2) is estimated with the 
following specification 
T; = A[POP;]BS [Di]B6 * e; (3.6) 
where POP; is the population in thousands for county i, D; is the value of the 
denominator obtained in (3.5), and e; is an independent normally distributed 
error term. Taking logarithms to both sides results in 
lnT; =InA+ BslnPOPi + BslnDi + lnei (3.7) 
The D; variable was identified as important in previous studies since it 
measures the supply of visitor days (Rosenthal, 1985; Cesario and Knetsch, 
1976; Ewing, 1980). It is hypothesized that the relationship between D; and T; is 
positive since the more facilities located at a lake, the greater is the expected 
number of trips to the lake. Ewing (1980) points out reasons why an increase in 
the number, attractiveness, or accessibility of destinations will result in some 
increase in the number of trips generated. He asserts that increased trips are 
likely because (1) the existence of more facilities increases the probability that 
knowledge about these facilities will be diffused more widely in the population; 
(2) crowding at facilities can be reduced by an increase in the supply of 
facilities, which in turn may have a positive feedback on the perceived 
attractiveness of the sites; and (3) increased attractiveness of the sites may 
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TABLE Ill 
OBSERVED PROBABILITIES THAT COUNTY I ATTENDS LAKE J (1) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson 
Adair OK 0.000 0.167 
Cherokee OK 0.000 0.000 
Cleveland OK 0.352 0.220 
Craig OK 0.000 1.000 
Creek OK 0.007 0.117 
Delaware OK 0.000 0.000 
Garvin OK 1.000 0.000 
Haskell OK 1.000 0.000 
Hughes OK 0.417 0.000 
Latimer OK 1.000 0.000 
LeFlore OK 0.490 0.000 
Lincoln OK 0.073 0.244 
Logan OK 0.300 0.000 
Mcintosh OK 0.949 0.051 
Mayes OK 0.000 0.205 
Muskogee OK 0.088 0.734 
Noble OK 0.000 0.000 
Nowata OK 0.000 0.000 
Okfuskee OK 1.000 0.000 
Oklahoma OK 0.471 0.037 
Okmulgee OK 0.730 0.022 
Osage OK 0.000 0.287 
Pawnee OK 0.000 0.000 
Payne OK 0.000 0.048 
Pittsburg OK 0.990 0.000 
Pontotoc OK 1.000 0.000 
Pottowatomie OK 0.784 0.000 
Rogers OK 0.027 0.598 
Seminole OK 0.231 0.000 
Sequoyah OK 0.000 0.000 
Tulsa OK 0.027 0.371 
Wagoner OK 0.000 0.467 
Washington OK 0.000 0.120 
Benton AR 0.000 0.000 
Crawford AR 0.000 0.000 
Sebastian AR 0.047 0.000 
Washington AR 0.000 0.000 
(1) Observed probabilities are estimated as: 
r .. 
P"- .:JL IJ- ni 
Keystone Oologah Tenkiller 
0.000 0.000 0.833 
0.000 0.000 1.000 
0.000 0.000 0.429 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.368 0.027 0.480 
0.000 0.000 1.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.583 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.510 
0.683 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.700 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.538 0.256 
0.000 0.000 0.179 
0.571 0.000 0.429 
0.000 1.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.044 0.033 0.415 
0.000 0.051 0.197 
0.046 0.483 0.184 
1.000 0.000 0.000 
0.824 0.000 0.128 
0.000 0.000 0.010 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.216 
0.009 0.365 0.000 
0.092 0.000 0.677 
0.000 0.000 1.000 
0.261 0.123 0.218 
0.133 0.000 0.400 
0.033 0.613 0.233 
0.000 0.000 1.000 
0.000 0.000 1.000 
0.000 0.000 0.953 
0.000 0.000 1.000 
where fij is the sampled number of visitor days from county i to lake j, ni is the total number of 
visitor days sampled from county i, and Pij is the observed probability that county i attends lake j. 
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TABLE IV 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES THAT COUNTY I ATIENDS LAKE J (1) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenkiller 
Adair OK 0.223 0.042 0.015 0.026 0.693 
Atoka OK 0.511 0.056 0.039 0.065 0.329 
Bryan OK 0.454 0.075 0.052 0.086 0.334 
Cherokee OK 0.180 0.651 0.011 0.018 0.141 
Choctaw OK 0.421 0.077 0.053 0.089 0.360 
Cleveland OK 0.178 0.269 0.061 0.102 0.389 
Coal OK 0.491 0.058 0.040 0.067 0.343 
Craig OK 0.152 0.516 0.073 0.031 0.228 
Creek OK 0.015 0.109 0.417 0.081 0.377 
Delaware OK 0.466 0.078 0.054 0.090 0.312 
Garvin OK 0.128 0.129 0.089 0.148 0.507 
Haskell OK 0.319 0.167 0.016 0.027 0.471 
Hughes OK 0.374 0.046 0.032 0.053 0.496 
Johnston OK 0.445 0.079 0.054 0.091 0.331 
Latimer OK 0.368 0.045 0.031 0.051 0.505 
LeFlore OK 0.216 0.033 0.023 0.038 0.689 
Lincoln OK 0.023 0.100 0.735 0.025 0.117 
Logan OK 0.162 0.040 0.116 0.047 0.635 
McClain OK 0.398 0.088 0.061 0.102 0.351 
McCurtain OK 0.356 0.091 0.063 0.105 0.384 
Mcintosh OK 0.908 0.028 0.007 0.004 0.053 
Mayes OK 0.282 0.062 0.109 0.383 0.164 
Murray OK 0.386 0.090 0.062 0.104 0.358 
Muskogee OK 0.111 0.412 0.060 0.022 0.397 
Noble OK 0.414 0.116 0.217 0.134 0.119 
Nowata OK 0.276 0.051 0.176 0.153 0.343 
Okfuskee OK 0.547 0.028 0.135 0.032 0.259 
Oklahoma OK 0.300 0.166 0.160 0.074 0.301 
Okmulgee OK 0.206 0.088 0.155 0.086 0.463 
Osage OK 0.250 0.332 0.062 0.131 0.225 
Ottawa OK 0.313 0.068 0.047 0.079 0.493 
Pawnee OK 0.366 0.067 0.130 0.078 0.359 
Payne OK 0.251 0.064 0.502 0.074 0.108 
Pittsburg OK 0.859 0.036 0.025 0.042 0.038 
Pontotoc OK 0.688 0.039 0.027 0.046 0.199 
Pottowatomie OK 0.415 0.063 0.181 0.073 0.268 
Pushmataha OK 0.450 0.065 0.045 0.076 0.364 
Rogers OK 0.055 0.239 0.025 0.326 0.356 
Seminole OK 0.259 0.067 0.093 0.077 0.504 
Sequoyah OK 0.284 0.112 0.011 0.018 0.575 
Tulsa OK 0.115 0.218 0.389 0.097 0.182 
Wagoner OK 0.384 0.184 0.036 0.029 0.367 
Washington OK 0.318 0.154 0.070 0.162 0.297 
Benton AR 0.314 0.077 0.053 0.089 0.466 
Boone AR 0.114 0.131 0.090 0.151 0.513 
Carroll AR 0.294 0.094 0.065 0.109 0.438 
Conway AR 0.099 0.114 0.079 0.132 0.576 
Crawford AR 0.378 0.036 0.025 0.041 0.520 
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TABLE IV (CONTINUED) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenkiller 
Franklin AR 0.388 0.060 0.041 0.069 0.441 
Garland AR 0.113 0.129 0.089 0.149 0.520 
Howard AR 0.318 0.116 0.080 0.134 0.353 
Johnson AR 0.375 0.071 0.049 0.081 0.424 
Logan AR 0.387 0.059 0.041 0.068 0.445 
Madison AR 0.292 0.071 0.049 0.082 0.506 
Marion AR 0.132 0.152 0.104 0.175 0.437 
Montgomery AR 0.265 0.064 0.044 0.074 0.554 
Newton AR 0.307 0.108 0.074 0.124 0.386 
Perry AR 0.104 0.120 0.082 0.138 0.556 
Pike AR 0.306 0.110 0.076 0.127 0.381 
Polk AR 0.360 0.083 0.057 0.096 0.404 
Pope AR 0.359 0.084 0.058 0.097 0.403 
Scott AR 0.383 0.066 0.045 0.076 0.429 
Searcy AR 0.130 0.149 0.103 0.172 0.446 
Sebastian AR 0.205 0.055 0.038 0.064 0.638 
Sevier AR 0.330 0.105 0.073 0.122 0.370 
Washington AR 0.233 0.045 0.031 0.052 0.639 
Yell AR 0.322 0.091 0.063 0.105 0.418 
Chautauqua KS 0.090 0.104 0.266 0.120 0.420 
Cherokee KS 0.093 0.107 0.073 0.123 0.604 
Crawford KS 0.105 0.120 0.083 0.139 0.554 
La bette KS 0.325 0.080 0.055 0.093 0.447 
Montgomery KS 0.113 0.129 0.089 0.149 0.520 
Neosho KS 0.111 0.128 0.088 0.148 0.525 
Barry MO 0.286 0.084 0.058 0.097 0.476 
Barton MO 0.111 0.128 0.088 0.148 0.525 
Jasper MO 0.102 0.117 0.081 0.136 0.564 
Lawrence MO 0.112 0.128 0.088 0.148 0.524 
McDonald MO 0.305 0.067 0.046 0.078 0.503 
Newton MO 0.328 0.074 0.051 0.086 0.460 
Stone MO 0.108 0.124 0.085 0.143 0.540 
Taney MO 0.124 0.143 0.098 0.165 0.469 
Lamar 1X 0.391 0.092 0.063 0.106 0.348 
Red River 1X 0.363 0.107 0.073 0.123 0.334 
(1) Predicted probabilities are estimated as: 
exp (B 1 + B2 CSj + Bs TCij) 
Pij = 
5 1\ B A 2: exp ( 8 1 + 2 C S k + Bs TCik) 
k=1 
where CSk is the number of campsites at lake k, TCik are the travel costs from county i to lake k, ~ 
= (~1 , 82. ~3 ) = (.788, .919, -1.217) is the estimated parameter vector, and Pij are the predicted 
probabilities that county i attends lake k. 
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induce substitution away from other leisure activities into outdoor recreational 
activities. 
The empirical results obtained are 
InTi = -16.263 + 1.213 lnPOPi + .92311nDi (3.8) 
(-7.00) (8.55) (5.037) 
where again the numbers in parenthesis are t values. 
The number of observations is 37 and other statistics are the following: 















The variance-covariance matrix is reported since it must ,be known to correct for 
the prediction bias described above. The F test is statistically significant at the 
one percent probability level. The individual parameters are also significant at 
the one percent level. 
The county population elasticity is positive and greater than one. Taking 
into account the effect of the other two functions given in equations (3.1) and 
(3.2) does not change this basic result as reported below. The author has not 
found a convincing justification for the appropriate magnitude of the population 
parameter. For example, Cesario and Knestch (1976) in a model similar to the 
one presented above, found population elasticities of 1.012 and 1.123 
corresponding to two different methods for measuring generalized travel costs. 
On the other hand, Flegg (1976) found population elasticities between .334 and 
.80 according to the type of visitor. Both argued that their estimates fall within 
their expectations without providing much elaboration. 
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The results of (3.8) also agree with Cesario and Knestch in that the income 
per capita variable is not as significant as population in explaining total visitor 
days emanating from each origin. The income per capita variable was not 
statistically significant and its inclusion resulted in a negative coefficient. 
Hence, it was decided to drop it from equation (3.8). Duffield (1984) reported 
that unlike many other studies, the income variable was significantly correlated 
with the visitor day rate but he also obtained a negative relationship. He 
explained this result by the fact that the wealthiest individuals lived farther from 
the recreation site, so that income was correlated with distance. Similarly, 
Flegg (1976) found income to be significant only for casual visitors, but with a 
negative .956 coefficient. He concluded that low income casual visitors tend to 
visit more frequently than those with higher incomes. 
The final specification of the legit part of equation (3.2) is 
1 
Pi = 1 + exp (87 + 8aSTAi + 8glnYi + 81 oln PO Pi+ 811lnDi) (3.9) 
where STA is a dummy qualitative variable, with one if the county is located in 
the state of Oklahoma and zero otherwise, Y is income per capita, and the other 























The Pseudo R2 is . 758. The only variable not significant is population but it 
was decided to keep it in the specification. The state variable is highly 
significant. It agrees with results found by Sutherland ( 1982a) although he 
suggested that this variable may turn out to be significant because of sampling 
47 
errors in the surveys conducted in his study. However, it may be reasonable to 
expect a significant positive sign. In-state residents probably have more 
information available about the state's recreational facilities through local news, 
friends, and promotional efforts of the local office of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers. Moreover, availability of rental cabins and cars might be restricted 
or bear a higher rate for out-of-state visitors. Table V presents the actual and 
predicted probabilities that one or more visits from county i were sampled at any 
of the lakes. 
The predicted sample visitor days by county are presented in Table VI. 
Except for a few counties, the predicted visitor days follow a similar pattern with 
respect to the observed data. Note that the specification of equation (3.2) 
smooths the predicted visitor days by county. Counties that showed up in the 
sample will generally have lower predicted visitor days while counties with zero 
observed visitor days will show positive values for visitor days. The dependent 
variable of the logistic part of (3.2) is a function of the sampling rate used in the 
survey. If a higher sampling rate is used, the predicted probability of sampling a 
county will be closer to one, and that county's observation will be taken into 
account in the loglinear part of (3.2). If a lower sampling rate is used, then the 
predicted probability of unobserved counties will be closer to zero, but this 
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(1) Observed probability is one if the county was sampled, zero otherwise. 









" 1\ 1\ 
1 + exp (8 7 + 8 8 STAi + 8 9 In Yi + 
where 
STAi = 1 if county is located in Oklahoma, zero otherwise. 
Yi = is per capita income for county i. 
POPi = is population at county i. 
Di = is the value of the denominator of the trip distribution function for county i. 
1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 




PREDICTED SAMPLE VISITOR DAYS BY LAKE AND COUNTY (1) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenklller Total 
Adair OK 12.68 2.41 0.87 1.45 39.35 56.76 
Atoka OK 1.49 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.96 2.91 
Bryan OK 12.44 2.05 1.41 2.37 9.15 27.41 
Cherokee OK 25.24 91.28 1.47 2.47 19.81 140.27 
Choctaw OK 1.01 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.87 2.41 
Cleveland OK 25.08 37.94 8.62 14.43 54.79 140.87 
Coal OK 0.69 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.48 1.40 
Craig OK 6.20 21.03 2.97 1.26 9.30 40.75 
Creek OK 4.16 30.35 116.15 22.66 104.96 278.28 
Delaware OK 2.13 0.36 0.41 0.25 1.42 4.57 
Garvin OK 1.21 1.22 0.84 1.41 4.81 9.49 
Haskell 0!< 9.14 4.79 0.47 0.78 13.50 28.68 
Hughes OK 8.08 0.99 0.69 1.15 10.73 21.64 
Johnston OK 0.38 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.28 0.85 
Latimer OK 4.24 0.51 0.35 0.59 5.82 11.51 
LeFlore OK 21.65 3.33 2.30 3.85 69.04 100.17 
Lincoln OK 1.85 8.19 60.37 2.07 9.61 82.09 
Logan OK 8.04 2.01 5.77 2.32 31.63 49.78 
McClain OK 4.23 0.93 0.64 1.08 3.73 10.61 
McCurtain OK 3.23 0.83 0.57 0.96 3.49 9.08 
Mcintosh OK 218.48 6.82 1.66 0.89 12.85 240.70 
Mayes OK 23.57 5.17 9.13 32.03 13.72 83.62 
Murray OK 1.11 0.26 0.18 0.30 1.03 2.88 
Muskogee OK 35.68 132.76 19.25 6.99 127.93 322.60 
Noble OK 0.89 0.25 0.47 0.29 0.26 2.15 
Nowata OK 3.81 0.71 2.43 2.11 4.72 13.77 
Okfuskee OK 15.37 0.77 3.79 0.89 7.29 28.12 
Oklahoma OK 408.83 255.97 217.69 100.73 410.40 1,363.62 
Okmulgee OK 20.93 8.98 15.77 8.78 47.03 101.48 
Osage OK 14.28 19.00 3.56 7.47 12.88 57.19 
Ottawa OK 12.68 2.78 1.91 3.21 20.00 40.58 
Pawnee OK 4.48 0.83 1.59 0.95 4.39 12.25 
Payne OK 22.16 5.68 44.27 6.56 9.56 88.23 
Pittsburg OK 87.25 3.69 2.54 4.26 3.85 101.58 
Pontotoc OK 47.18 2.71 1.87 3.12 13.66 68.53 
Pottowatomie OK 33.52 5.11 14.64 5.90 21.62 80.80 
Pushmataha OK 0.43 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.35 0.96 
Rogers OK 5.11 22.26 2.29 30.35 33.19 93.20 
Seminole OK 8.78 2.27 3.16 2.62 17.11 33.93 
Sequoyah OK 39.63 15.68 1.53 2.56 80.37 139.78 
Tulsa OK 268.25 509.42 910.04 227.25 425.18 2,340.13 
Wagoner OK 40.59 19.47 3.79 3.04 38.81 105.70 
Washington OK 22.93 11.13 5.02 11.67 21.41 72.15 
Benton AR 14.73 3.61 2.49 4.17 21.84 46.84 
Boone AR 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.17 
Carroll AR 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.22 
Conway AR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.09 
Crawford AR 20.17 1.90 1.31 2.19 27.74 53.32 
Franklin AR 0.39 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.44 1.00 
Garland AR 0.54 0.62 0.42 0.71 2.48 4.77 
Howard AR 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 
Johnson AR 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.61 
Logan AR 1.28 0.20 0.13 0.23 1.47 3.31 
Madison AR 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.16 
Marion AR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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TABLE VI (CONTINUED) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenklller Total 
Montgomery AR 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 
Newton AR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Perry AR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pike AR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Polk AR 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.24 
Pope AR 1.50 0.35 0.24 0.40 1.68 4.17 
Scott AR 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.11 
Searcy AR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sebastian AR 35.42 9.60 6.61 11.08 110.40 173.11 
Sevier AR 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 
Washington AR 43.71 8.45 5.82 9.76 119.82 187.56 
Yell AR 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.21 
Chautauqua KS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Cherokee KS 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.29 
Crawford KS 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.94 1.69 
Labette KS 0.80 0.20 0.14 0.23 1.10 2.46 
Montgomery KS 0.32 0.37 0.25 0.42 1.47 2.82 
Neosho KS 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.36 
Barry 00 0.27 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.44 0.93 
Barton 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Jasper 00 1.12 1.29 0.89 1.49 6.19 10.99 
Lawrence 00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.13 
McDonald 00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Newton 00 1.13 0.26 0.18 0.29 1.58 3.43 
Stone 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Taney 00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Lamar TX 1.39 0.33 0.22 0.38 1.24 3.56 
Red River TX Q,Ql Q,QQ Q,QQ _Q.QQ Q,Ql Q.~ 
Total 1,612.80 1,238.28 1,489.84 553.92 2,021.58 6,916.43 
(1) Predicted sample visitor days are computed as: 
[ A A J[ 1 J Tij= A[POPi]85[Di] 86 . . X 












population at county i 
denominator of trip distribution function for county i 
1 if county i is located in Oklahoma, zero otherwise 
per capita income for county i 
number of campsites at lake k 
travel costs from county i to lake k 
estimated variance of the trip generation function 
[exp [.5B 2 -.5v(i)l] 
estimated variance of the predicted value of the trip generation function 
estimated parameter vector. 
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Tables VII to IX present the population and income arc elasticities by 
county; the price arc elasticity matrix for Ft. Gibson Lake; and the price arc 
elasticity for Tenkiller Lake. The arc elasticities were obtained by raising the 
value of the independent variable by one percent and recording the effect in the 
predicted quantity of visitor days. Notice that with the above procedure, 
individual estimates of the elasticities were determined. The aggregate 
population elasticity is 1.23 but counties that were not sampled have greater 
elasticities because the probability of showing up in the sample increases 
proportionally more with respect to those counties that already are close to one. 
Furthermore, counties with greater populations (i.e., Oklahoma and Tulsa) have 
the lowest elasticities, reflecting perhaps the existence of greater urban 
recreational opportunities. 
The aggregate income elasticity is 0.21. Individual elasticities display 
more variation, with a range from close to zero to more than seven. Again, 
those counties that were close to one in the probability of being sampled have 
the lower elasticities. Burt and Brewer (1971) reported income elasticities that 
varied from .14 to .71. Sinden (1974) found the income elasticity was not 
significant except for fishing, which was .64. Recall that the income variable 
enters only in the logit function of (3.2) while population changes both the level 
and the probability of the county being sampled. The income elasticities are 
constant across lakes (not shown) confirming the integrability condition 
discussed above. 
The price elasticity matrix for Lake Ft. Gibson shows the effect on visitor 
day attendance from county ito lake j caused by a one percent increase in the 
price of attending Lake Ft. Gibson. An aggregate elasticity by county is also 
presented which measures the percentage change in total visitor days supplied 





















































POPULATION AND INCOME ARC ELASTICITIES 
BY COUNTY 
Population Income 
State Elasticity (1) Elasticity (2) 
OK 2.534 0.178 
OK 4.848 6.263 
OK 1.481 1.359 
OK 1.215 0.004 
OK 2.481 6.781 
OK 1.216 0.115 
OK 2.364 5.993 
OK 1.230 0.007 
OK 1.201 0.000 
OK 2.354 6.070 
OK 1.946 3.830 
OK 1.251 0.081 
OK 1.379 0.768 
OK 2.522 6.937 
OK 1.629 2.040 
OK 1.231 0.106 
OK .1.220 0.004 
OK 1.247 0.136 
OK 1.775 2.869 
OK 2.312 5.905 
OK 1.222 0.000 
OK 1.217 0.009 
OK 2.197 5.116 
OK 1.198 0.000 
OK 2.206 5.156 
OK 1.334 0.499 
OK 1.272 0.197 
OK 1.158 0.000 
OK 1.215 0.021 
OK 1.254 0.200 
OK 1.283 0.341 
OK 1.482 1.285 
OK 1.248 0.223 
OK 1.218 0.045 
OK 1.220 0.026 
OK 1.228 0.110 
OK 2.547 7.099 
OK 1.214 0.016 
OK 1.345 0.650 
OK 1.215 0.005 
OK 1.160 0.000 
OK 1.217 0.018 
OK 1.210 0.001 
AR 1.804 3.157 
AR 2.634 7.677 
AR 2.632 7.614 
AR 2.644 7.708 
AR 1.613 2.079 
AR 2.570 7.253 
AR 2.499 7.017 
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TABLE VII (CONTINUED) 
Population Income 
County State Elasticity (1) . Elasticity (2) 
Howard AR 2.647 7.687 
Johnston AR 2.605 7.474 
Logan AR 2.464 6.692 
Madison AR 2.642 7.636 
Marion AR 2.668 7.764 
Montgomery AR 2.655 7.664 
Newton AR 2.674 7.766 
Perry AR 2.674 7.763 
Pike AR 2.666 7.758 
Polk AR 2.632 7.624 
Pope AR 2.484 6.866 
Scott AR 2.650 7.672 
Searcy AR 2.671 7.766 
Sebastian AR 1.554 1.896 
Sevier AR 2.652 7.710 
Washington AR 1.290 0.487 
Yell AR 2.635 7.649 
Chautauqua KS 2.677 7.741 
Cherokee KS 2.626 7.627 
Crawford KS 2.559 7.300 
Labette KS 2.518 7.027 
Montgomery KS 2.504 6.991 
Neosho KS 2.612 7.522 
Barry MO 2.589 7.420 
Barton MO 2.663 7.754 
Jasper MO 2.429 6.654 
Lawrence MO 2.636 7.711 
McDonald MO 2.651 7.741 
Newton MO 2.533 7.162 
Stone MO 2.659 7.752 
Taney MO 2.649 7.728 
Lamar TX 2.511 7.032 
Red River TX 2.653 7.738 
Aggregate 1.234 0.209 
(1) Population Elasticities are estimated as 
POPj AVDAY 
VDAYi • APOPj 
(2) Income elasticities are estimated as: 
Yj AVDAY 
VDAYi • APOPi 
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TABLE VIII 
PRICE ARC ELASTICITY MATRIX FOR FT. GIBSON LAKE (1) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenklller Aggregate 
Adair OK -0.001 -1.205 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.052 
Atoka OK -0.253 -1.454 -0.253 -0.253 -0.253 -0.321 
Bryan OK -0.073 -1.276 -0.073 -0.073 -0.073 -0.163 
Cherokee OK 0.080 -1.125 0.080 0.080 0.080 -0.704 
Choctaw OK -0.373 -1.573 -0.373 -0.373 -0.373 -0.466 
Cleveland OK -0.008 -1.212 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.332 
Coal OK -0.251 -1.452 -0.251 -0.251 -0.251 -0.321 
Craig OK 0.049 -1.156 0.049 0.049 0.049 -0.573 
Creek OK 0.013 -1.191 0.013 0.013 O.Q13 -0.118 
Delaware OK -0.343 -1.542 -0.343 -0.343 -0.343 -0.437 
Garvin OK -0.363 -1.562 -0.363 -0.363 -0.363 -0.517 
Haskell OK 0.007 -1.197 0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.194 
Hughes OK -0.024 -1.227 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.079 
Johnston OK -0.391 -1.590 -0.391 -0.391 -0.391 -0.486 
Latimer OK -0.066 -1.269 -0.066 -0.066 -0.066 -0.119 
LeFlore OK 0.000 -1.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.040 
Lincoln OK 0.011 -1.193 0.011 0.011 0.011 -0.109 
Logan OK -0.001 -1.205 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.050 
McClain OK -0.186 -1.387 -0.186 -0.186 -0.186 -0.291 
McCurtain OK -0.389 -1.589 -0.389 -0.389 -0.389 -0.499 
Mcintosh OK 0.005 -1.999 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.029 
Mayes OK 0.006 -1.198 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.069 
Murray OK -0.336 -1.535 -0.336 -0.336 -0.336 -0.444 
Muskogee OK 0.050 -1.155 0.050 0.050 0.050 -0.446 
Noble OK -0.435 -1.634 -0.435 -0.435 -0.435 -0.574 
Nowata OK -0.016 -1.220 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.078 
Okfuskee OK -0.002 -1.205 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.035 
Oklahoma OK 0.013 .-1.191 0.013 0.013 0.013 -0.186 
Okmulgee OK 0.007 -1.197 0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.099 
Osage OK -0.026 -1.230 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.426 
Ottawa OK -0.014 -1.217 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.096 
Pawnee OK -0.062 -1.265 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062 -0.143 
Payne OK -0.007 -1.210 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.084 
Pittsburg OK 0.002 -1.202 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.042 
Pontotoc OK 0.003 -1.201 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.045 
Pottowatomie OK -0.001 -1.205 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.077 
Pushmataha OK -0.332 -1.532 -0.332 -0.332 -0.332 -0.410 
Rogers OK 0.019 -1.185 0.019 0.019 0.019 -0.268 
Seminole OK -0.029 -1.233 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.110 
Sequoyah OK 0.013 -1.191 0.013 0.013 0.013 -0.122 
Tulsa OK 0.026 -1.179 0.026 0.026 0.026 -0.237 
Wagoner OK 0.017 -1.187 0.017 0;017 0.017 -0.205 
Washington OK 0.011 -1.193 0.011 0.011 0.011 -0.174 
Benton AR -0.178 -1.380 -0.178 -0.178 -0.178 -0.271 
Boone AR -0.717 -1.913 -0.717 -0.717 -0.717 -0.874 
Carroll AR -0.511 -1.709 -0.511 -0.511 -0.511 -0.624 
Conway AR -0.627 -1.823 -0.627 -0.627 -0.627 -0.763 
Crawford AR -0.053 -1.256 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.096 
Franklin AR -0.309 -1.510 -0.309 -0.309 -0.309 -0.381 
Garland AR -0.649 -1.846 -0.649 -0.649 -0.649 -0.804 
Howard AR -0.635 -1.831 -0.635 -0.635 -0.635 -0.773 
Johnson AR -0.375 -1.575 -0.375 -0.375 -0.375 -0.460 
Logan AR -0.282 -1.483 -0.282 -0.282 -0.282 -0.353 
Madison AR -0.386 -1.585 -0.386 -0.386 -0.386 -0.471 
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TABLE VIII (CONTINUED) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenklller Aggregate 
Marion AR -0.839 -2.033 -0.839 -0.839 ·0.839 -1.020 
Montgomery AR -0.348 -1.548 -0.348 -0.348 -0.348 -0.424 
Newton AR -0.596 -1.793 -0.596 -0.596 -0.596 -0.725 
Perry AR -0.662 -1.858 -0.622 -0.622 -0.662 -0.805 
Pike AR -0.607 -1.803 -0.607 -0.607 -0.607 -0.738 
Polk AR -0.450 -1.648 -0.450 -0.450 -0.450 -0.549 
Pope AR -0.412 -1.611· -0.412 -0.412 -0.412 -0.513 
Scott AR -0.359 -1.559 -0.359 -0.359 -0.359 -0.438 
Searcy AR -0.825 -2.019 -0.825 -0.825 -0.825 -1.003 
Sebastian AR -0.076 -1.279 -0.076 -0.076 -0.076 -0.142 
Sevier AR -0.578 -1.775 -0.578 -0.578 -0.578 -0.704 
Washington AR -0.013 -1.217 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.067 
Yell AR -0.497 -1.695 -0.497 -0.497 -0.497 -0.607 
Chautauqua KS -0.572 -1.769 -0.572 -0.572 -0.572 -0.696 
Cherokee KS -0.579 -1.779 -0.579 -0.579 -0.579 -0.706 
Crawford KS -0.627 -1.823 -0.627 -0.627 -0.627 -0.771 
Labette KS -0.403 -1.602 -0.403 -0.403 -0.403 -0.499 
Montgomery KS -0.648 -1.844 -0.648 -0.648 -0.648 -0.802 
Neosho KS -0.686 -1.882 -0.686 -0.686 -0.686 -0.839 
Barry MO -0.443 -1.642 -0.433 -0.433 -0.433 -0.544 
Barton MO -0.706 -1.901 -0.706 -0.706 -0.706 -0.859 
Jasper MO -0.561 -1.758 -0.561 -0.561 -0.561 -0.702 
Lawrence MO -0.704 -1.900 -0.704 -0.704 -0.704 -0.858 
McDonald MO -0.371 -1.570 -0.371 -0.371 -0.371 -0.451 
Newton MO -0.380 -1.579 -0.380 -0.380 -0.380 -0.469 
Stone MO -0.684 -1.879 -0.684 -0.684 -0.684 -0.832 
Taney MO -0.787 -1.981 -0.787 -0.787 -0.787 -0.957 
Lamar TX -0.460 -1.659 -0.460 -0.460 -0.460 -0.570 
Red River TX -0.587 -1.783 -0.587 -0.587 -0.587 -0.714 
Price arc elasticities for county i are estimated as: 
TC.. AVDAY·k 
Eij = VDAYik ATCij' for all k=1 , ... 5 
The aggregate price elasticities are estimated as: 
A TCi AVDAYi 
E ii = VDAYi ATCj 
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TABLE IX 
PRICEARC ELASTICITY MATRIX FORTENKILLER LAKE (1) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenklller Aggregate 
Adair OK -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -1.226 -0.857 
Atoka OK -1.473 -1.473 -1.473 -1.473 -2.660 -1.864 
Bryan OK -0.329 -0.329 -0.329 -0.329 -1.529 -0.729 
Cherokee OK 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 -1.187 -0.153 
Choctaw OK -1.741 -1.741 -1.741 -1.741 -2.924 -2.167 
Cleveland OK -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -1.215 -0.480 
Coal OK -1.476 -1.476 -1.476 -1.476 -2.662 -1.883 
Craig OK 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 -1.183 -0.253 
Creek OK 0.047 0.047. 0.047 0.047 -1.158 -0.408 
Delaware OK -1.359 -1.359 -1.359 -1.359 -2.546 -1.729 
Garvin OK -1.432 -1.432 -1.432 -1.432 -2.619 -2.033 
Haskell OK -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -1.185 -0.548 
Hughes OK -0.258 -0.258 -0.258 -0.258 -1.459 -0.853 
Johnston OK -1.637 -1.637 -1.637 -1.637 -2.822 -2.030 
Latimer OK -0.750 -0.750 -0.750 -0.750 -1.945 -1.354 
LeFlore OK 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 -1.196 -0.822 
Lincoln OK 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 -1.192 -0.128 
Logan OK -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -1.218 -0.779 
McClain OK -0.744 -0.744 -0.744 -0.744 -1.939 -1.164 
McCurtain OK -1.632 -1.632 -1.632 -1.632 -2.816 -2.087 
Mcintosh OK 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 -1.194 -0.054 
Mayes OK 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 -1.189 -0.182 
Murray OK -1.330 -1.330 -1.330 -1.330 -2.518 -1.755 
Muskogee OK 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 -1.156 -0.430 
Noble OK -0.447 -0.447 -0.447 -0.447 -1.646 -0.590 
Nowata OK -0.109 -0.109 -0.109 -0.109 -1.311 -0.521 
Okfuskee OK -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -1.218 -0.327 
Oklahoma OK 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 -1.180 -0.327 
Okmulgee OK 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 -1.168 -0.521 
Osage OK -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -1.222 -0.289 
Ottawa OK -0.099 -0.099 0.099 -0.099 -1.302 -0.692 
Pawnee OK -0.333 -0.333 -0.333 -0.333 -1.533 -0.764 
Payne OK -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -1.215 -0.142 
Pittsburg OK 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -1.202 -0.043 
Pontotoc OK 0.013 -0.013 0.013 0.013 -1.191 -0.227 
Pottowatomie OK -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -1.208 -0.326 
Pushmataha OK -1.837 -1.837 -1.837 -1.837 -3.018 -2.267 
Rogers OK 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 -1.176 -0.400 
Seminole OK -0.223 -0.233 -0.233 -0.223 -1.424 -0.828 
Sequoyah OK 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 -1.136 -0.623 
Tulsa OK 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 -1.183 -0.197 
Wagoner OK 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 -1.170 -0.408 
Washington OK 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 -1.182 -0.336 
Benton AR -1.082 -1.082 -1.802 -1.082 -2.273 -1.637 
Boone AR -2.784 -2.784 -2.784 -2.784 -3.954 -3.384 
Carroll AR -2.357 -2.357 -2.357 -2.357 -3.533 -2.872 
Conway AR -3.130 -3.130 -3.130 -3.130 -4.296 -3.802 
Crawford AR -0.781 -0.781 -0.781 -0.781 -1.976 -1.403 
Franklin AR -2.265 -2.265 -2.265 -2.265 -3.442 -2.785 
Garland AR -2.596 -2.596 -2.596 -2.596 -3.769 -3.206 
Howard AR -1.923 -1.923 -1.923 -1.923 -3.103 -2.339 
Johnson AR -2.239 -2.239 -2.239 -2.239 -3.416 -2.738 
Logan AR -2.210 -2.210 -2.210 -2.210 -3.298 -2.645 
Madison AR -2.722 -2.722 -2.722 -2.722 -3.893 -3.314 
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TABLE IX (CONTINUED) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenklller Aggregate 
Marion AR -2.403 -2.403 -2.403 
Montgomery AR -2.985 -2.985 -2.985 
Newton AR -2.123 -2.123 -2.123 
Perry AR -3.044 -3.044 -3.044 
Pike AR -2.094 -2.094 -2.094 
Polk AR -2.178 -2.178 -2.178 
Pope AR -1.968 -1.968 -1.968 
Scott AR -2.323 -2.323 -2.323 
Searcy AR -2.455 -2.455 -2.455 
Sebastian AR -0.880 -0.880 -0.880 
Sevier AR -2.021 -2.021 -2.021 
Washington AR -0.189 -0.189 -0.189 
Yell AR -2.258 -2.258 -2.258 
Chautauqua KS -2.302 -2.302 -2.302 
Cherokee KS -3.248 -3.248 -3.248 
Crawford KS -2.864 -2.864 -2.864 
Labette KS -2.230 -2.230 -2.230 
Montgomery KS -2.589 -2.589 -2.589 
Neosho KS -2.798 -2.798 -2.798 
Barry MO -2.495 -2.495 -2.495 
Barton MO -2.877 -2.877 -2.877 
Jasper MO -2.675 -2.675 -2.675 
Lawrence MO -2.851 -2.851 -2.851 
McDonald MO -2.738 -2.738 -2.738 
Newton MO -2.335 -2.335 -2.335 
Stone MO -2.956 -2.956 -2.956 
Taney MO -2.567 -2.567 -2.567 
Lamar TX -1.744 -1.744 -1.744 
Red River TX -1.829 -1.829 -1.829 
Price arc elasticities for county i are estimated as: 
TC·· AVDAYik 
Eij = VDAYik ATCij for all k=1 , ... 5 
The aggregate price elasticities are estimated as: 
A TCi 
Eii = VDAYi 
AVDAYi 
.6-TCj 
-2.403 -3.578 -2.916 
-2.985 -4.153 -3.632 
-2.123 -3.302 -2.578 
-3.044 -4.211 -3.692 
-2.094 -3.273 -2.544 
-2.178 -3.356 -2.654 
-1.968 -3.148 -2.443 
-2.323 -3.499 -2.828 
-2.455 -3.630 -2.979 
-0.880 -2.073 -1.641 
-2.021 -3.201 -2.458 
-0.189 -1.391 -0.957 
-2.258 -3.435 -2.750 
-2.302 -3.478 -2.796 
-3.248 -4.413 -3.952 
-2.864 -4.034 -3.512 
-2.230 -3.407 -2.756 
-2.589 -3.762 -3.199 
-2.798 -3.968 -3.412 
-2.495 -3.669 -3.053 
-2.877 -4.046 -3.491 
-2.675 -3.847 -3.336 
-2.851 -4.020 -3.463 
-2.738 -3.909 -3.327 
-2.335 -3.511 -2.877 
-2.956 -4.124 -3.587 
-2.567 -3.740 -3.117 
-1.744 -2.927 -2.156 
-1.829 -3.011 -2.224 
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The aggregate elasticity by county is less than one in absolute value except for 
a few cases. The aggregate price elasticities and the elasticities by lake exhibit 
the expected signs. That is, a price increase at Lake Fort Gibson reduces the 
level of attendance for all counties because it is less attractive to visit the sites. 
The reduction in attractiveness is captured through the variable Di. A price 
increase at Lake Fort Gibson also induces substitution away from itself. Note 
that some counties have positive cross price elasticities. In these cases the 
reduction in total visitor days emanating from those counties is less severe 
because of an increase in visitation rates at other lakes. 
Oklahoma and Tulsa counties are among those showing positive cross 
price elasticities. Observe that the cross price elasticities are the same for each 
county confirming the theoretical restriction of the MNL model. Similar results 
are obtained in the price elasticity matrix for Lake Tenkiller, although the 
aggregate price elasticities by county display more variation. 
Benefit Estimation 
The demand functions derived above are obtained by changing the price 
of recreating at a given lake and recording its effect on visitor days demanded. 
Hence, a series of solution points are found that lie on the demand curves. The 
Willig (1976) conditions are assumed to hold and thus to approximate 
compensated consumer surplus through the integration of the area below the 
ordinary demand curve. 
The demand functions cannot be directly integrated. Numerical integration 
(Rosenthal, 1987) and polynomial fitting (Sutherland, 1982a) were disregarded 
in computing the benefits measured under the demand curves. The grid 
linearization technique formulated by Duley and Norton (1975), which will be 
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applied later in the mathematical programming formulation, requires an even 
spacing of the segments on the quantity axis and a function convex to the origin. 
These conditions cannot be satisfied with the techniques indicated above. 
A simple exponential function is regressed instead on each of the price-
quantity solution points. For each demand schedule, ten points are derived, 
where the highest price is the maximum observed and the lowest price is the 
minimum observed. Note that the price range is equal for all counties. 
Although this method introduces errors in the demand specification, the fit is 
nearly perfect for all counties. The exponential function used is 
b Pi = a q i fori = 1 , ... ,83 (3.1 0) 
where Pi and qi are price and quantity demanded by county i, and a and b are 
parameters to be estimated. The benefits for the first segment of the demand 
curves is determined by the procedure outlined in Schreiner, Chantaworn, and 
Badger (1987) where the upper bound for integration is determined by the 
intersection of the price axis with the line tangent to the demand curve at the 
maximum observed price. The benefits for the rest of the segments are found 
by solving the definite integral of (3.1 0). For further details on the grid 
linearization technique see Dulay and Norton ( 1975) and Schreiner, 
Chantaworn, and Badger (1987). 
Demand Projection 
The demand functions will shift through time according to new values of 
the independent variables. The demand functions are projected for each time 
period of the planning horizon by updating income per capita and population 
per county. The growth rate of per capita income is assumed to be the same for 
all counties. The annual rate of growth in per capita income of 1.91 estimated 
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by Schreiner, Chantaworn, and Badger (1987) from time series data is used in 
the projections. Population projections by county from year 1975 to 2000 are 
taken from the U.S. Bureau of Census (1979). 
Notice that the arc elasticities presented above will change through time. 
That is, as income and population increases, the probability of observing a 
county will eventually increase at a decreasing rate reaching an upperbound of 
one. Hence, equation (3.1 0) needs to be estimated for every time period, 
county, and lake which results in 830 distinct demand equations. 
Limitations 
More efficient estimates can be obtained by using a hierarchical response 
model (i.e., nested multinomial logit). Since the Di variable estimated in (3.5) is 
used in (3.8) and (3.9), the estimated standard errors must be corrected for the 
use of variables constructed using previous estimates (Amemiya, 1978 and 
McFadden, 1981 ). The hierarchical response model was not pursued since the 
demand estimated above has a simple structure so it is likely that the loss in 
efficiency is small. Moreover, the main concern is in obtaining plausible results 
for the predicted values for later use in the mathematical programming model. 
Maximum likelihood estimation of equation (3.1) should yield better 
estimators because, although the sample is relatively large, there still are many 
zero observations in the number of visitor days. 
Lack of data on additional recreational sites visited by the recreationists 
and on time costs precluded a better estimation. 
The IIA hypothesis has not been formally tested (Hausman and McFadden, 
1984). It is expected to hold in this application because the distance to the 
recreational sites from a given county show large variations, contributing to 
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widening of the dissimilarities among alternative lakes due to quality 
differences. Recent applications of the travel cost method using a MNL 
specification have been applied to model recreational demand (Caulkins, 
Bishop, and Bouwes, 1986; Rosenthal, 1987). 
Caulkins, Bishop, and Bouwes (1986) point out that the assumption of 
each day trip representing a decision independent of past or planned future 
visits is not very plausible. They suggest a Markov chain model may be more 
appropriate. In the context of qualitative response models, these models can be 
extended to the analysis of discrete panel data which refers to a time series of 
observations on discrete responses of a cross section of recreationists by 
treating each possible response history as a discrete alternative (McFadden, 
1982). 
In summary, the demand procedure outlined above has several 
advantages. It handles substitution effects avoiding some statistical problems 
such as multicollinearity and zero cells observations; provides individual 
elasticity estimates; fulfills the integrability condition; and separates the price 
from the quality effect. 
CHAPTER IV 
RECREATION COST ESTIMATION FOR LAKES FORT GIBSON 
AND TENKILLER 
The objective of this chapter is to estimate the cost components for 
recreation services at Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller. In Chapter II the 
following cost components were identified as relevant for an investment 
planning model: private travel costs of recreation, costs of operating and 
maintaining recreation services, costs of expanding recreation capacity, and 
potential externalities such as congestion. The estimates for these costs are 
presented below. The existence of congestion costs at these lakes is tested 
following the hedonic travel cost model procedure. 
Private Costs of Recreation 
The primary private costs of recreation are the travel costs from the 
recreationists' origin to the lakes as well as the opportunity costs of time. 
Unfortunately, time costs are not included in this study because data were not 
available in the original survey from the recreationists on a county basis. Travel 
costs are derived from Schreiner et. al. (1985), and Schreiner, Chantaworn, and 
Badger (1987). For those counties that were sampled, travel costs are 
computed from the following equations: 




CT ck = (2) (0.069)Dck 
where 
CVDck = travel cost per visitor day ($} for the sample of recreationists 
interviewed at lake k from county c. 
CT ck = travel cost per trip ($) for those recreating at lake k from county 
c. 
AVDck = average number of visitor days per trip for the sample of 
recreationists interviewed at lake k from county c, and 
Dck = distance in miles from county seat c to the dam site of lake k. 
The 0.069 number is the per mile cost ($) of operating an automobile in 
1975 according with the Department of Transportation. 
For those counties that were not sampled, travel costs were computed from 
CVDck = CTdAVDk 
where 
AVDk = average number of visitor days per trip for the sample of 
recreationists interviewed at lake k. 
For those counties outside the market area of Fort Gibson Lake but within 
Tenkiller's, the maximum observed travel cost to Fort Gibson Lake is considered 
as the relevant travel cost. 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs 
Operation and maintenance costs were taken from the 1978 Master Plan 
for Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller. These Master Plans were prepared by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. An implicit price deflator was used to bring the 
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O&M costs back to the 1975 base period. The O&M costs per visitor day were 
about $0.088 and $0.12 for Tenkiller and Fort Gibson, respectively. 
Capacity Costs 
Refurbishing 
Refurbishing costs are taken from estimates prepared by Schreiner, 
Chantaworo, and Badger (1987) who used data provided by the Corps of 
Engineers. Previous experience has shown that refurbishing is carried out 
every 15 years at an approximate cost of $836.24 per campsite at 1975 prices. 
The visitor days per campsite ratio in 1975 was 7,352 and 5,865 for Fort Gibson 
and Tenkiller, respectively. These ratios were computed from the reported total 
visitor days and number of campsites at both lakes (Schreiner, Willet, Badger, 
and Antle, 1985). Refurbishing costs per visitor day in 1975 prices result in 
$0.11 and $0.143 for Fort Gibson and Tenkiller, respectively. 
New Investment 
Schreiner, Chantaworo, and Badger (1987) estimated the investment cost 
per visitor day capacity at $1.33 for Fort Gibson Lake. Assuming a 25 year life 
for new facilities, and a 3 percent real interest rate (see discussion Chapter 2) 
the amortized cost per visitor day is $0.0763. 
The 1978 Master Plan for Lake Tenkiller provides detailed data by public 
use area on the number and costs of new facilities. That is, investment at the 
lake is carried out by identifying suitable public use areas for further 
development. Since the public areas are not homogeneous, the investment 
costs vary across area. Hence, it is possible to estimate a cost curve of 
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investment for Lake Tenkiller which resulted in diseconomies of size as shown 
below. 
Public use areas require a large number of inputs to be fully developed 
such as campsites, boat ramps, roads, restrooms, and electric outlets. To obtain 
costs of investment in terms of visitor days it is necessary to construct an index 
which makes alternative public use area investment costs comparable. The 
number of new campsites is chosen as the representative input across public 
use areas. The Army Corps of Engineers determined that 506 new campsites 
were needed to meet the Master Plan projected visitor days. The Master Plan 
also indicates the need for relocating 373 campsites to new public use areas. 
The U.S. Army Corps adjusted the total visitation reported at Tenkiller in 
the 1978 Master Plan since the project traffic counters included individuals that 
visit residential and commercial sites but are not related to project visitation. 
Hence, the Master Plan projected 2,850,000 visitor days for 1983. The 
investment requirements specified by the 1978 Master Plan were thus 
estimated using an incremental visitor days projection of about 650,000. 
However, to remain consistent with the procedures carried out in the 1975 
survey (Badger, Schreiner, and Presley, 1977) and with the cost computations 
for Fort Gibson (Schreiner, Badger, and Chantaworn, 1987), the Master Plan's 
incremental visitor days projection is scaled back up to the earlier reported data 
by multiplying the visitor days per campsite in 1975 (5,865) times the proposed 
new campsites (506), which results in a projected increase of 2,967,690 visitor 
days. 
The 1975 recreation capacity at Tenkiller Lake is assumed to be equal to 
the number of visitor days that attended the lake in 1975 as reported by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (1978b). Therefore, the recreation capacity results in 
5,226,300 annual visitor days (VDAY). 
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Table X shows the investment costs for Tenkiller Lake by public use area. 
The first column shows the cost of developing each public use area. This cost 
has been adjusted by deducting the relocation costs of campsites and picnic 
tables and common costs such as boat ramps, fee collection stations, and trailer 
dump stations. Common costs are those incurred in facilities that serve 
recreationists in a broader area than the single public use area. Total 1978 
costs by public use area are adjusted to 1975 using a price deflator. The 
deflated common costs, and the engineering and administrative costs have 
been added back to each public use area according to their contribution to total 
planned visitor days. The projected incremental visitor days column is 
computed by multiplying planned campsites by the visitor days per campsite 
ratio of 5,865. Total 1975 costs are then converted into average cost per visitor 
day, which is computed as accumulated total cost divided by accumulated 
visitor days. The information contained in the total accumulated costs and 
accumulated visitor days is used to estimate a long run average cost curve as 
presented below. 
Estimation of a cost curve for incremental investment at Lake Tenkiller is 
carried out following lntriligator (1978). For a detailed discussion on 
econometric estimation of cost curves see Johnston 1960, Scherer 1977, and 
Walters 1963 and 1968. 
A common functional form of a total cost curve is the cubic: 
TIC= ao + a1VDAY + a2VDAY2 + aaVDAY3 (4.1) 
where TIC is the total investment cost ($) and VDAY is the total visitor days in 
millions. In the long run, ao, which is fixed cost, vanishes. The cost curve 
usually estimated is the average cost curve since it alleviates heteroskedasticity 
problems. Hence, the estimated average cost curve is 
AIC = a1 + a2VDAY + a3VDAY2 (4.2) 
TABLE X 
INCREMENTAL INVESTMENT COSTS PER VISITOR DAY FOR LAKE TENKILLER 
(US$) 
Amortized 
Adjusted Total Projected Accumulated Average Predicted Predicted 
Public Total Investment Accumulated Incremental Incremental Cost Marginal Marginal 
Use Costs Relocation Common Costs costs in 1975 New Visitor Visitor In 1975 Costin 1975 Cost in 
Area 1978 Costs Costs 1978 Prices Campsites Days Days Prices Prices 1975 Prices 
Horseshoe Bend 120,000 0 0 120,000 144,669 3) 175,950 175,950 0.8222 0.9837 0.0565 
DamSite 276,000 68,040 0 207,960 364,370 31 181,815 357,765 1.0185 1.0999 0.0632 
Dry Creek 366,300 70,560 59,920 235,820 601,460 Zl 158,355 516,120 1.1653 1.2011 0.0690 
Cookson Bend 530,200 59,440 0 470,760 1,116,269 82 480,930 997,050 1.1196 1.5085 0.0866 
Standing Rock Landing 286,000 85,680 0 200,320 1,351,742 46 269,790 1,266,840 1.0670 1.6809 0.0965 
Chicken Creek Point 749,700 6,520 4,480 738,700 2,019,696 34 199,410 1,466,250 1.3775 1.8084 0.1039 
Pettit Bay 536,600 16,080 0 520,520 2,509,634 ~ 217,005 1,683,255 1.4909 1.9471 0.1118 
Carters Landing 386,800 23,000 9,520 354,280 2,842,828 25 146,625 1,829,880 1.5536 2.0408 0.1172 
Sisemore Landing 586,200 2,000 9,520 574,680 3,370,669 32 187,680 2,017,560 1.6707 2.1607 0.1241 
StrayHorn Landing 424,500 4,000 56,000 364,500 3,771,505 ffi 381,225 2,398,785 1.5723 2.4044 0.1381 
Snake Creek Cove 855,700 6,000 9,520 840,180 4,533,184 «> 234,600 2,633,385 1.7214 2.5543 0.1467 
Elk Creek Landing §12.QQQ ....!QQ2 ___Q ~.ooo 5,125,822 .2. ~~ 2,967,690 1.7272 2.7680 0.1590 
Total 5,730,000 313,320 148,960 5,267,720 506 2,967,690 
Common Costs: Engineering and Administrative 745,000 
Public Use Area Common Costs 148,960 
Total Common Costs 893,960 
SOURCE: Computed from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Oklahoma. Tenkiller ferry Lake Illinois River. Oklahoma. OM No. 1c Master Plan 
-..,J 
(updated) Tulsa District, 197Bb. 0 
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where AIC is the average investment cost. The quadratic term in (4.2) was 
found not statistically significant for investment costs at Lake Tenkiller. A linear 
average cost curve provided the best fit. The empirical result is: 
AIC =. 871 + .3195 VDAY 
(12.96) (8.338) 
Adjusted R2 = 86.2 and F1, 1 o = 69.5. The "t" values are reported in 
parenthesis. 
The total investment cost curve is given by 
TIC= .871VDAY + .3195VDAY2 (4.3) 
Equations similar to (4.2) have been estimated for a number of industries 
and it has been found that the long-run average cost curves are L-shaped. That 
is, the diseconomies of size portion of the cost curve does not appear in 
industrial empirical applications. On the other hand, for Tenkiller's case, the 
results found above suggest that expansion of new capacity at this lake is facing 
diseconomies of size. This result is expected since it is not possible for the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers to replicate the minimum average cost public use area 
whereas firms are generally capable of replicating the minimum average cost· 
plant. 
The marginal cost curve is given by 
MIC = .871 + .639 VDAY 
The predicted marginal costs and the amortized predicted marginal costs 
in 1975 prices are reported in the last two columns of Table X. 
Congestion Costs 
In Chapter II it was concluded that it is possible for equilibrium between 
demand and supply in outdoor recreational services to be brought about by 
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changes in the level of congestion since the government has historically 
provided recreational facilities in a nonexclusionary basis. Hence, it is 
necessary to investigate the relevance of congestion costs at Lakes Fort Gibson 
and Tenkiller. 
A unit of measurement for congestion and its price is required for testing 
the above relationship. The measurement of congestion varies with the nature 
of the facility. For example, McConnell and Sutinen (1984) refer to the following 
measures of congestion for different types of recreation activities: density on the 
slope and waiting time for skiers, number of encounters with other visitors per 
day in wilderness recreation, and number of bathers per acre of beach. 
Several approaches have been developed to measure the price of 
congestion. The most widely used approach is the contingent valuation 
technique in which recreation participants are asked directly how much they 
would be willing to pay for less crowded facilities. One of the advantages of the 
contingent valuation approach is that the effect of congestion can be isolated 
from other factors. On the other hand, it can be subject to biases since this 
method is based on hypothetical situations. 
A second approach is simulation, which has been applied to wilderness 
recreation by Smith and Krutilla (1976). The cost of congestion can be derived 
by relating level of inputs at a recreational site with stochastic levels of 
congestion due to queues or crowded facilities. 
A third approach is the indirect valuation of congestion by using data on 
observed behavior. Three methods have been developed for the latter 
approach, the household production function approach (Deyak and Smith, 
1978), the own quality-own price model (Smith and Desvousges, 1986; Smith, 
Desvousges, and Fischer, 1986; Vaughn and Russell, 1982), and the hedonic 
travel cost method (Brown and Mendelsohn, 1984; Mendelsohn, 1984). The 
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main advantage of the indirect methods is that valuation is determined by what 
individuals actually do rather than on what they might do under hypothetical 
situations. However, it is difficult to isolate the effects of congestion by using the 
indirect methods. 
The hedonic travel cost method (HTCM) is applied to determine the price 
of congested facilities. For the current study it was not possible to implement 
the contingent valuation method since the survey conducted in 1975 (Badger, 
Schreiner, and Presley, 1977) did not include questions regarding willingness 
to pay for reduced levels of congestion. The Deyak and Smith (1978) 
household production function approach imposes theoretical restrictions based 
on reduced form equations where the dependent variables are quantity and 
price of recreation service flows. This approach requires data at the individual 
level which were not readily available from the earlier survey. Likewise, as 
mentioned in Chapter II, the own quality-own price technique requires extensive 
data based on a large sample of sites. 
The HTCM has several appealing aspects. By treating heterogeneous 
sites as if each were a bundle of characteristics, the site price, derived indirectly 
from observing the willingness to pay through travel costs, can be decomposed 
into a set of implicit prices for each characteristic. Hence, it is possible to 
consider congestion as one of the site's characteristics and determine its 
implicit price. Moreover, this approach may be more relevant for policymakers 
since the resource manager controls some of the characteristics of the sites 
which can help them to allocate resources more efficiently (Brown and 
Mendelsohn, 1984). Finally, the data needed to apply the HTCM is less 
demanding. 
The theoretical foundations of the HTCM is presented in Brown and 
Mendelsohn. The procedure to estimate the implicit prices involves two steps. 
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First, distance and travel time are regressed on the characteristics of the sites. 
Then the hour and distance prices need to be combined in an appropriate index 
to derive the actual prices that each individual faces. For example, the following 
regressions can be estimated: 
T(Z) = (4.4) 
C(Z) = (4.5) 
where T(Z) is the miles traveled to each site, C(Z) is the number of travel hours 
needed to reach each site, and the Zi are levels of the site characteristics. 
Brown and Mendelsohn show that the marginal hedonic price of characteristic 
Zi is given by: 
(4.6) 
where ·~ is the cost per mile traveled, y is the marginal wage rate, and a is the 
fraction of the marginal wage rate considered as opportunity cost by the 
recreationist. Note that a linear hedonic price function has been adopted which 
implies that these prices are constant. An endogenous marginal price 
specification leads to problems of identification and selectivity bias 
(Mendelsohn, 1984). 
As mentioned above, data on travel hours needed to reach each site were 
not available for this study. Hence, only equation (4.4) is estimated. Data for all 
Oklahoma lakes in the McClellan-Kerr River Navigation System were used in 
the estimation procedure. Information about lake characteristics were 
presented in Table II. The density measure of peak month-visitor days per 
campsite is used to represent the level of congestion. As noted by Brown and 
Mendelsohn, only observed distance traveled from county i to lake j is included 
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because we are trying to identify the best possible frontier in characteristic 
space. 
The empirical results showed that congestion as modelled with peak 
month-visitor days per campsite was not a statistically significant characteristic 
in explaining willingness to travel to the lakes. The congestion coefficient was 
found not significant in all specifications tried, even being positive in most of the 
cases. 
The final form chosen was 
DISTi,j = a1 SHORj + a2CAMPSITEj + e i,j 
where DISTi,j is the distance from county i to lake j, SHORj is the number of 
shoreline miles at lake j, and CAMPSITEj is the number of campsites at lake j, 
and e i,j is an error term. 
The empirical results for this equation are 
DISTi,j = .0785 SHORj + .12 CAMPSITEj 
(2.897) (8.241) 
with the following statistics 
Number of Observations=1 05 F(1,103) = 11.86 Log Likelihood Test =11.437 
The equation is significant at the 1 percent probability level as are the 
individual coefficients with reported "t" statistics shown in parenthesis. The 
intercept term was not significant and the fit was better without the intercept term 
so it was dropped from the final specification. 
The results regarding the irrelevance of congestion for cases such as the 
one presented agrees with previous findings. For example, Deyak and Smith 
(1978) found that congestion is important for the decision to participate in 
remote camping. However, it is not likely to affect decisions concerning 
developed camping. Furthermore, they found that congestion was important in 
determining the decision to participate but not the level once the decision had 
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been made. Brown and Mendelsohn (1984) concluded that congestion does 
not seem to be a consistent factor for steelhead fishermen when choosing sites. 
Congestion appears to be more important in other contexts such as wilderness 
recreation, skiing, and beach attendance (McConnell and Sutinen, 1984). 
Since the Army Corps of Engineers plans the expansion of the sites' 
facilities according to the needs of a typical peak day, then it is also reasonable 
to expect that facilities provided are sufficient to cover demand for recreation 
most of the time. As reported below, the willingness to pay for additional 
campsites is slightly higher than the actual costs. 
Given 1975 travel costs of $0.069 per mile and using equation (4.6) 
without the travel time costs, the implicit price per campsite (willingness to pay) 
is computed as: 
Pes = 2($0.069) (.12) = $0.01656 
where Pes is the implicit per visitor day campsite cost. The implicit price is 
compared to actual costs calculated as the following: 
Cost per Campsite in 1978 (1) 
Cost per Campsite in 1975 prices 
Visitor Days per Campsite Tenkiller Lake 
Visitor Days per Campsite Fort Gibson Lake 
Cost per Campsite per VDAY Tenkiller Lake 
Cost per Campsite per VDA Y Fort Gibson Lake 
VDAY/Distance Tenkiller Lake (2) 
VDA Y/Distance Fort Gibson Lake (2) 
Cost of Campsite/Distance for Tenkiller Lake 
Cost of Campsite/Distance for Fort Gibson Lake 
(1) Taken from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1978b) 












The results obtained from the HTCM suggest that the price of the 
characteristic "campsites" is $0.01656 as revealed by recreationists behavior, 
which is probably not statistically different from the actual cost of a campsite at 
each of the lakes as shown above. 
It is worth mentioning some limitations of the HTCM. Brown and 
Mendelsohn caution against the use of the HTCM for valuing nonmarginal 
changes of the characteristics since they found sizeable valuation errors in their 
application. Smith and Kaoru (1985) indicate that results obtained using the 
HTCM are not robust to the assumptions and procedures adopted, especially 
with regard to the handling of negative attribute prices and how the quantity of 
site characteristics are defined. Particular limitations to the application carried 
out above include lack of data about visitations on a weekly or daily basis, and 
the somewhat arbitrary definition of the variable accounting for congestion. 
Summary 
In summary, it is important to point out one of the concluding comments by 
Harrington (1987), who states that the most important gap in our knowledge 
about recreation supply is the cost of congestion. He argues that no theory 
exists that is directly useful in determining how recreation users are 
quantitatively affected by crowding conditions. Further analysis in this study is 
limited to private travel costs of recreation, costs of operating and maintaining 
recreation services, and costs of expanding recreation capacity for the Lakes of 
Fort Gibson and Tenkiller as estimated in this chapter. 
CHAPTERV 
INVESTMENT MODEL FORMULATION 
The objective of this chapter is to present the mathematical programming 
model that yields the optimum investment path for Lakes Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller such that the net present value of social benefits is maximized. 
Model Formulation 
The mathematical programming model is outlined in this section. A 
nonlinear version is first presented that incorporates endogenous prices as well 
as investment levels for both lakes. Next, a linear version is presented where 
prices are set exogenously to the model. The linear model is the final version 
applied in this study. 
Assumptions 
1. The present value of net social benefits is maximized. Ordinary 
demand curves approximate closely the compensated demand 
curves. The government is able to enforce the optimal solution. 
2. Recreation demand in year t is a function of price in that year and no 
other period. 
3. Demand segments enter as linear approximations and are scaled by 
a predicted observation-to-sample ratio of 2,863.9. 
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4. Five-year decision time units are assumed and model results are 
representative of the initial year of the decision time unit. 
5. All costs and benefits are assumed to occur as a lump sum for the 
representative initial year of the decision time unit. 
6. There are no economies of size in O&M and refurbishing costs. 
Likewise, there are no economies of size in investment costs for Fort 
Gibson Lake but diseconomies of size in investment costs are 
considered for Tenkiller Lake. 
7. Travel costs are constant per visitor day within a county but change 
across counties. 
8. An annual real discount rate of three percent is used and assumed 
constant over the planning period. 
9. All values are expressed in 1975 dollars. 
10. The planning period is 25 years and is assumed to be the life of new 
investments before refurbishing needs to take place. 
11. There are no budQ:St constraints. 
12. Existing recreation capacity at the lakes devalues following a straight 
line depreciation rule. 
13. The difference between the discounted terminal value for the natural 
resource and capital stocks and its initial value is assumed to be 
negligible. Therefore, these terms are dropped from the model 
equations. 
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The Model Eguations 
The model is a variant of Schreiner, Chantaworn, and Badger (1987), 
Willet (1983), and Norton and Scandizzo (1981 ). The notation of the Schreiner 
et. al. is used in what follows. The equations of the model are: 
[ 
5 2 83 11 5 2 83 
Max 5 L :L :L :L at BtkcsXtkcs- :L :L :L at akcOtkc 
t=1 k=1 C=1 S=1 t=1 k=1 C=1 
Gross Benefits 
5 2 83 5 2 5 
- :L :L :L at bkOtkc -
t=1 k:1 C=1 
:L :L J3r dkRjk :L <xt -
j=1 k=1 t=j 
O&MCost Refurbishing Cost 
Travel Costs 
5 5 
L I3s e Sj11 L at 
j=1 t=j 
New lnv. Cost 
Ft. Gibson Lake 
(5.1) 




1. Recreation Demand and Supply Equilibrium. 
83 83 11 
- L Otkc + L L 0tkcs Xtkcs ~ 0 for all t, k 
C=1 C=1 S=1 
(5.2) 
2. Recreation Capacity. 
83 t r t 12 s 
:L Otkc - .:L et-j+1 Rjk - :L L et-j+1Sjki ~ Vtk for all t, k (5.3) 
C=1 J=1 j=1 i=1 
3. Maximum Refurbishing. 
t 
:L Rjk < Vk - Vtk for all t, k 
j=1 
(5.4) 
4. Tenkiller Investment Constraints 
5 
I. Sjki ~ Wi for i=1 , ... 11 
j=1 
5. Number of Campsites 
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(5.5) 
t r t 12 
CStk- I. llr et-j+1 Rjk-. I. I. lls etj+ 1 Sjki ~ CSok for all t, k (5.6) 
j=1 j=1 i=1 
6. Convex Combination Constraint 
11 2 Ekmc 2 
2, Xtkcs - H I. (p ) Ptm ~ H - H I. Ekmc for all t, k, c (5.7) 
s m=1 t-1 m m=1 
m¢k m¢k 
7. Demand Functions 
1 11 2 Ekmc 2 
Q 2. 0tkcsXtkcs - H 2. (p ) Ptm = H - H 2. Ekmc 
t-1 ,kc s m=1 t-1 ,m m=1 
for all t, k, c (5.8) 
Definition of Variables 
Xtkcs = demand segment s for county c, lake k, and decision time unit t. 
Otkc = quantity of recreation visitor days for county c, lake k, and 
decision time unit t. 
RJ< = refurbishing activity in visitor day capacity for lake k and decision 
time unit j. 
Sjki = new investment activity segment i in visitor day capacity in 
decision time unit j for lake k; k=1 refers to Fort Gibson Lake and 
k=2 refers to Tenkiller Lake. Note that Fort Gibson Lake has only 
one segment. 
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CStk = campsite activity in number of campsites for lake k and decision 
time unit t. 
Ptk = total price per visitor day for lake k and decision time unit t. 
Definition of Parameters 
at = average annual discount rate using a 3 percent interest rate for 
decision time unit t. 
f3r = capital recovery factor for 15 years at 3 percent interest rate. 
f3s = capital recovery factor for 25 years at 3 percent interest rate. 
e~ = adjustment factor due to depreciation in decision unit t. 
e~ = 1, depreciation rate is .20 per time period. 
e~ = adjustment factor due to depreciation in decision unit t. 
e~ = 1, depreciation rate is .33 per time period. 
0tkcs = quantity demanded at segments for lake k, county c, in decision 
time unit t. 
~ r = campsites-refurbishing ratio. 
~s = campsites-new investment ratio. 
Btkcs = benefit for demand segment s for county c, lake k, in decision 
time unit t. 
Wi = maximum investment at Lake Tenkiller for segment i. 
akc = travel cost per visitor day from county c to lake k. 
bk = O&M cost per visitor day at lake k. 
dk = cost of refurbishing per visitor day capacity for lake k. 
e = investment cost per visitor day of new capacity for Fort Gibson 
Lake. 
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fi = investment cost per visitor day of new capacity for segment i for 
Tenkiller Lake. 
gk = congestion cost per visitor day/campsites for lake k. 
Vtk = visitor day capacity in time period t for lake k assuming no 
refurbishing of the 1975 capacity for market area. 
Vk = visitor day capacity in 1975 for lake's k market area. 
CSok = number of campsites in 1975 for lake k. 
Ekmc = cross price elasticity between lakes k and m for county c. 
H = population-to-predicted sample visitor day scale factor which is 
equal to 2,863.9. This factor was computed as the sum of total 
visitor days attending both lakes in 1975 divided by the sum of 
the total predicted sample visitor days for both lakes. 
t=j = decision time unit, and equals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
k=m = lake, and equals 1, 2 
c = county, and equals 1, 2, ... ,83 
s = demand and benefit segments, and equals 1,2, ... ,11 
= investment segment and equals 1,2, ... , 12 for Ten killer Lake and 
1 for Fort Gibson Lake. 
Remarks About the Model 
a) Note that although the demand and benefit functions have been 
linearized following the procedure by Dulay and Norton (1975), the model still 
has nonlinear variables. Equation (5.1) specifies the congestion variable as the 
division of two endogenous variables in time t. Likewise, equations (5.6) and 
(5. 7) present some terms which are a division of an endogenous variable in 
period t by another endogenous variable in period t-1. 
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Change-of-variable transformation method was attempted to linearize the 
model but it remained basically nonlinear. Among nonlinear general purpose 
methods, Manne (1985b) distinguishes those that depend upon gradients such 
as Newton methods, and those that do not. Newton methods cannot easily be 
applied to models involving linear activity analysis and/or weak inequalities. 
Fixed-point algorithms overcome the difficulties of the Newton method but are 
much slower (Manne, 1985b}. See Manne (1985a) for a detailed discussion of 
solution methods for solving economic equilibrium problems. The application of 
nonlinear general purpose methods suitable for the above model were 
dismissed because of the sheer size of the model and software availability to 
the author. 
The suggestion made by Norton and Scandizzo (1981} of solving the 
model recursively by updating the lagged endogenous variables was not 
followed since while it is appropriate for comparative statics, it is not a suitable 
method for solving a dynamic optimization model. 
It was decided to specify the model without endogenous price substitution 
effects. In Chapter VII exogenous price substitution effects are built into the 
model. From the above discussion, it follows that equation (5.8} is no longer 
required and equation (5. 7} can be rewritten as follows: 
1 1 
I. Xtkcs ~ H 
S=1 
b) The congestion variable in equation (5.1) is dropped since 
congestion costs are zero as shown in Chapter 4. Thus, equation (5.6) is also 
dropped from the model specification since it is no longer needed. 
c) The model consists of 4,670 columns and 1,691 rows. For 
computational considerations out-of-state counties were aggregated into states. 
This simplification results in 43 Oklahoma counties and 4 additional 
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observations that account for Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri and Texas. The travel 
costs for these states are computed as: 
~ (TCck)(VDA Y ck} 
c 
TCsk = ~ VDAY ck 
c 
where TCsk is the travel cost from state s to lake k, TCck is the travel cost from 
out-of-state county c to lake k, and VDAY is the predicted visitor days from out-
of-state county c to lake k. 
A dummy travel zone is also included that represents the demand for 
recreation at Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller that are located outside their 
market areas. The demands for this dummy travel zone are 14 and 15 percent· 
of total visitor days at Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller respectively as defined 
by Schreiner, Willet, Badger, and Antle (1985). The travel costs for the dummy 
travel zone are computed using the same formula used to compute the state's 
travel costs. The model is set up in several LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheets. The 
data are converted from WK1 format into MPS format using the TaMPS program 
(Li, Ray, Stoecker, 1988). The model is solved using IBM's MPSX program. 
Model Validation 
The investment programming model presented in the previous section is 
specified with arbitrarily large absolute values in the objective function 
corresponding to the capacity activities. Hence, these activities are prevented 
from appearing in the optimal solution thus making it possible to validate the 
model for the base period. Let this scenario be named the "Without Capacity 
Activities" (WCA) scenario. 
The programming model solution resulted in 4,110,000 and 5,226,000 
total optimal visitor days in 1975 for Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller 
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respectively, which perfectly coincides with the observed visitor days at both 
lakes. 
Table XI presents the predicted visitor days at Lakes Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller first using the demand model and then utilizing the programming 
model. The programming optimal visitor days by each county is validated 
against the predicted visitor days obtained from the demand model presented in 
Chapter Ill. 
The predicted visitor days for the demand model are computed from the 
multiplication of the predicted sample visitor days reported in Table VI for lake k 
times the market area share of lake k times the population-predicted-visitor days 
ratio for lake k. The predicted dummy travel zone is computed as the difference 
between total observed visitor days and total market area. The results from the 
programming model are reasonably close to the ones obtained from the 
demand model with the exception of some counties that show low visitor days 
for lake Tenkiller. 
Table XII presents the results of some simulation error statistics applied to 
the visitor days reported in Table XI (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981 ). The mean 
absolute error (MAE) and the root mean square error (RMSE) can be evaluated 
only by comparing them with the average size of the visitor days variable. The 
root mean square percent error (RMSPE) and the mean absolute percent error 
(MAPE) normalize the error between 0 and 1 00. Theil's inequality coefficient 
(U) always falls between zero and one. If U is close to zero, then the prediction 
errors will be smaller. The predicted visitor days are validated reasonable well 
by the programming model, being closer for Fort Gibson than for Tenkiller. 
TABLE XI 
VALIDATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL 
PROGRAMMING MODEL 
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Visitor Days Predicted by the Demand Model and by the Programming Model 
(Visitor Days) 
Demand Model Programming Model 
County State Fort Gibson Tenkiller Fort Gibson Tenkiller 
Adair OK 6,885 86,469 3,630 61,449 
Atoka OK 468 2,102 434 103 
Bryan OK 5,849 20,103 6,063 32,309 
Cherokee OK 260,542 43,521 190,272 48,998 
Choctaw OK 529 1,905 496 105 
Cleveland OK 108,306 120,400 176,592 158,660 
Coal OK 233 1,058 222 51 
Craig OK 60,032 20,442 54,258 24,716 
Creek OK 86,628 230,639 69,021 208,563 
Delaware OK 1,022 3,128 1,023 331 
Garvin OK 3,484 10,564 3,931 887 
Haskell OK 13,675 29,662 9,842 29,912 
Hughes OK 2,839 23,569 2,892 14,418 
Johnston OK 191 617 176 45 
Latimer OK 1,464 12,779 1,483 8,910 
LeFlore OK 9,517 151,699 9,680 133,089 
Lincoln OK 23,385 21 '115 25,722 22,927 
Logan OK 5,748 69,510 5,852 52,287 
McClain OK 2,664 8,192 2,800 580 
MCurtain OK 2,367 7,659 2,455 10,068 
Mcintosh OK 19,477 28,235 20,422 25,728 
Mayes OK 14,760 30,141 7,011 30,737 
Murray OK 742 2,267 789 246 
Muskogee OK 378,950 281,106 303,236 265,248 
Noble OK 710 562 793 783 
Nowata OK 2,023 10,375 2,236 10,109 
Okfuskee OK 2,209 16,024 2,242 17,971 
Oklahoma OK 645,012 901,792 508,572 1,089,488 
Okmulgee OK 25,620 103,341 48,148 111,736 
Osage OK 54,233 28,311 43,231 38,265 
Ottawa OK 7,928 43,953 8,119 37,844 
Pawnee OK 2,358 9,653 2,432 12,904 
Payne OK 16,224 21,001 16,591 16,593 
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TABLE XI {CONTINUED) 
Demand Model Programming Model 
County State Fort Gibson Tenkiller Fort Gibson Tenkiller 
Pittsburg OK 10,521 8,455 10,710 10,755 
Pontotoc OK 7,727 30,009 7,868 34,387 
Pottowatomie OK 14,587 47,510 14,900 64,973 
Pushmataha OK 179 766 153 27 
Rogers OK 63,527 72,936 47,509 75,446 
Seminole OK 6,474 37,593 6,645 33,652 
Sequoyah OK 44,766 176,594 32,176 145,710 
Tulsa OK 1,454,106 934,255 1,544,266 883,245 
Wagoner OK 55,585 85,286 37,930 86,987 
Washington OK 31,759 47,039 57,558 51,710 
Arkansas 71,225 630,156 68,757 689,574 
Kansas 2,410 8,517 2,362 227 
Missouri 4,722 18,338 4,627 358 
Texas 941 2,751 877 223 
Total Market Area 3,534,600 4,442,100 3,367,004 4,543,244 
Outside Market Area 575,400 783,900 742,996 682,756 
Total 4,110,000 5,226,000 4,110,000 5,226,000 
Mean Market Area 75,204 94,513 71,638 96,665 
TABLE XII 
SIMULATION ERROR STATISTICS 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) 
Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) 





Root Mean Square Percent Error (RMSPE) 2.54 
Theil Inequality Coefficient (U) 








1 T Y~ = simulated value for observation t, 
MAE = T l: I ~ -Y~ I ; 
t=1 
Y~ = actual value for observation t 
2) Mean absolute percent error: 
1 T 
MAPE = T l: 
t=1 
IY~- Y~l 
X 100 ya 
t 
3) Root mean square error: 
RMSE= 
T 2 
1 l: (Ys _ ya ) 
T t=1 t t 
4) Root mean square percent error: 
RMSPE = 
T (yS _ yaJ2 1. l: t t 
T a 




TABLE XII (CONTINUED) 
5) Theil Inequality Coefficient: 
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Results 
Let the model presented in the Model Equations Section be called the Full 
Cost Model (FCM). The principal results of this model are presented in 
Table XIII. The results of this model are compared with the Without Capacity 
Activities (WCA) scenario. This comparison allows us to follow the "with" and 
"without" principle in project evaluation (Squire and van der Tak, 1975; 
Gittinger, 1982) to determine the contribution of investment to social benefits. 
The results of the WCA scenario are presented in Table XIV. 
The total annual visitor days for Lake Fort Gibson declines in the FCM 
since all marginal costs are paid in full by recreationists. Only in the last period 
the visitor days are greater than the observed in 1975. Visitor days for lake 
Tenkiller show a milder reduction in the third period and surpasses the base 
visitor days by the fourth period. Maximum refurbishing is carried out in all 
periods except for Fort Gibson's second period. New investment activities are 
higher in the latter periods to meet the increased demand for recreation. The 
cost structure shows that travel costs are the most important cost component 
followed by O&M costs. The investment budget for the entire planning period 
reaches about 10 million dollars for lake Tenkiller whereas it is just below 2.5 
million for lake Fort Gibson. The present value of net social benefits is $212.7 
million and the benefit cost ratio is 2.41. 
The WCA scenario resulted in a present value of net social benefits of 
$189.3 million. Hence, there is an incremental $23.4 million of net social 
benefits due to the inclusion of capacity activities. It is indeed worthwhile to 
conduct these activities in lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller. The visitor days 
projection under this scenario show that the capacity constraint is binding for all 
time periods and for both lakes. Visitor days need to adjust to the straight line 
TABLE XIII 
RESULTS OF THE RECREATION INVESTMENT 
PROGRAMMING MODEL BY DECISION 
TIME UNIT, FULL COST MODEL 
Unit 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 
Visitor Days (annual) VDAY 
Fort Gibson 2,918,974 3,179,396 3,728,874 3,771,831 
Ten killer 5,226,000 5,254,702 5,104,973 5,668,148 
Additions to Capacity VDAY 
Fort Gibson Refurbishing 0 661,311 822,000 822,000 
New Capacity 0 0 0 537,395 
Total 0 661,311 822,000 1,359,395 
Tenkiller Refurbishing 0 1,045,200 1,045,200 1,045,200 
New Capacity 0 28,702 204,412 1,306,599 
Total 0 1,073,902 1,249,612 2,351,799 
Gross Benefits (annual) $1,000 16,338 17,762 19,058 21,074 
Costs (annual) $1,000 
Travel Costs 6,063 6,376 6,841 7,393 
O&M Costs 812 846 899 954 
Refurbishing 0 14.96 16.18 16.18 
New Investment 0 0.13 8.31 108.99 
TOTAL 6,875 7,238 7,764 8,472 
Net Benefits (annual) $1,000 9,463 10,524 11,294 12,602 
Net Benefits Per 
Visitor Day in 1975 
Prices 1.16 1.25 1.28 1.33 
Investment Budget 
in 1975 Prices 
Fort Gibson Refurbishing 0 72,744 90,420 90,420 
New Capacity 0 0 0 714,735 
Tenkiller Refurbishing 0 149,464 149,464 149,464 
New Capacity 0 28,234 207,723 2,724,665 
TOTAL 0 250,442 447,606 3,679,284 
Present Value of Marginal 
Net Social Benefits $1,000 212,690 

























RESULTS OF THE RECREATION INVESTMENT 
PROGRAMMING MODEL BY DECISION 
TIME UNIT, WITHOUT CAPACITY 
ACTIVITIES SCENARIO 
Unit 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 
Visitor Days (annual) VDAY 
Fort Gibson 4,110,000 3,288,000 2,466,000 1,644,000 
Tenkiller 5,226,000 4,180,800 3,135,600 2,090,400 
Additions to Capacity VDAY 
Fort Gibson Refurbishing 0 0 0 0 
New Capacity 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 0 
Tenkiller Refurbishing 0 0 0 0 
New Capacity 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 0 
Gross Benefits (annual) $1,000 17,192 16,825 14,967 12,858 
Costs (annual) $1,000 
Travel Costs 6,829 5,923 4,388 3,187 
O&M Costs 955 764 573 382 
Refurbishing 0 0 0 0 
New Investment 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 7,784 6,687 4,961 3,569 
Net Benefits (annual) $1,000 9,408 10,138 10,006 9,289 
Net Benefits Per 
Visitor Day 
in 1975 Prices 1.01 1.36 1.79 2.49 
Investment Budget 
in1975 Prices 
Fort Gibson Refurbishing 0 0 0 0 
New Capacity 0 0 0 0 
Tenkiller Refurbishing 0 0 0 0 
New Capacity 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 
Present Value of Marginal 
Net Social Benefits $1,000 189,355 

























decay of existing capacity. Notice the upward trend of net benefits per visitor 
day due to the rationing provoked by the binding capacity constraints. The 
programming model is forced to select visitor days with higher willingness to 
pay. For the same reason, the benefit cost ratio increases to 3.1 0. 
CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENT COST-
SHARING RULE 
Introduction 
The Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 1965 (U.S. Statutes at Large, 
1965) encourages state and local participation by a 50-50 cost-sharing basis of 
new capital expenditures. The purpose of this chapter is to determine if that rule 
is appropriate for recreational activities at lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller. That 
is, if the maximization of welfare accrued to the state of Oklahoma under the 50-
50 cost sharing rule gives significantly different results for the optimal visitor 
days and investment plans obtained from maximizing national social welfare. 
Since the market area includes out-of-state counties, then part of the 
benefits obtained from investing in lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller are attained 
by out-of-state individuals. Therefore, since these water projects are partly 
financed by the state and local governments, they may prefer to discount some 
of the out-of-state benefits. On the other hand, state and local governments 
have more leverage in terms of revenue potential if they invest in projects that 
bring about more federal monies into the state. 
The validity of including benefits from the out-of-state individuals who 
stimulate Oklahoma's economy by spending some of their budget in outdoor 




Marshall (1970) derives what he defined as the Association Rule which 
refers to the cost sharing rule where the costs are shared in the same proportion 








where 8 stands for total benefits accruing to society, C stands for total costs to 
society, k is the proportion of 8 accruing to the local agents at the margin, n is 
the proportion of C paid by the local agents at the margin, and the subscripts L 
and F represents local and nonlocal agents. The net social benefits are 
maximized when 
dB/dq = dC/dq 
However, the net local benefits are maximized when 
dBL/dq = dCL/dq 
From the latter relationship we can derive 
k * dB/dq = n * dC/dq 
Therefore, only when n = k will the scale desired by the local agents be 
equal to the socially efficient scale. If k > n, then the local decision makers will 
invest more relative to the social optimum and if k < n, then they will invest less 
than the social optimum level. The Association Rule implies that k = n. 
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Note that according to the Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 1965 
the federal agencies bear up to 50 percent of separable costs and 1 00 percent 
of the joint costs. For operation and maintenance costs the federal agencies 
bear none of the separable costs but all joint costs. 
The empirical issue is how to separate the local benefits from the total 
benefits. It is necessary to define first the market area of each lake without 
violating the assumptions of the TCM. In most applications, the market area has 
been defined somewhat arbitrarily as the area served by the lake such that 
some proportion of the visitor day rate originated from the area. Smith and 
Kopp (1980) propose a test developed by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) to 
examine the hypothesis that an increase in distance from the site produces an 
increase in the likelihood of an origin zone's observed visitor rate resulting from 
behavior inconsistent with the conventional travel cost model. The test is based 
on the fact that estimated residuals from a constant coefficient model will exhibit 
nonrandom error terms when applied to observations inconsistent with its 
behavioral assumptions. The residuals are computed recursively with the 
introduction of each new observation and then they are standardized using an 
orthogonal transformation. One of the advantages of this approach is that it 
does not require prior specification as to which of the distance zones is 
inconsistent with the TCM assumptions. 
Once the market area for each lake has been delineated then the 
disaggregation between local and federal benefits follow the established 
political demarcation. 
It is important to point out the distinction between indirect benefits and 
indirect effects for calculating the marginal benefits of recreation to the local 
agents. Indirect effects originate from backward and forwards linkages with 
industries related to the provision of outdoor recreation which are usually 
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computed as changes in value added using an input-output model. Although it 
is well known in the literature that indirect effects should not be counted as 
benefits to a project since they are pecuniary impacts that represent income 
distribution rather than allocative effects, these effects are still counted as 
benefits in some water project analysis (Stabler, Van Kooten, and Meyer, 1988). 
On the other hand, indirect benefits are defined as the increase in welfare in 
related but distorted markets. That is, if there is a difference between marginal 
benefits and marginal costs in a related market then the difference times the 
increase in output in that market due to the project should be included as 
indirect benefits of the project. 
Stabler, Van Kooten, and Meyer (1988) examine indirect effects and 
indirect benefits from the point of view of a province or state. They argue that an 
important exception to not considering indirect effects as benefits is when 
impacts of the project go beyond the project's region. Regional indirect benefits 
may occur in large part through transfers from other regions. In particular, 
indirect benefits arise from spending funds raised outside the region. If the 
federal funding has a specific purpose then the full amount of the transfer 
should be used as a basis for calculating indirect benefits. In this case, an 
increase in value added of related industries constitutes the basis for 
calculating the secondary benefits since a large share of the loss of output 
linked with a decrease in private spending will probably take place outside the 
region. On the other hand, if the federal funding has a general purpose nature it 
would be necessary to compare the difference in indirect benefits due to the 
project with the benefits derived from the best alternative use of the funds in the 
region in order to identify the net gain, if any, that could be attributed to the 
external funding of the project (Stabler et. al.). 
99 
Procedure 
Let the mathematical programming model presented in Chapter V be 
called the Full Cost Model (FCM). The FCM includes both Oklahoma and out-
of-state counties. The cost components are paid their full price. On the other 
hand, let the welfare accruing only in Oklahoma be called the Oklahoma 
Welfare Model (OWM). The OWM includes only Oklahoma counties within Lake 
Tenkiller market area as defined by Schreiner, Willet, Badger and Antle, 1985. 
The refurbishing and investment costs are specified at 50 percent of the full 
price. It is assumed that the dummy travel zone "Outside Market Area" is not 
located in Oklahoma. 
The mathematical programming model is solved under the above 
specifications. 
Results 
Table XV presents the principle results obtained with the two models. The 
FCM results in higher visitor days for both lakes and for each time period than 
the Oklahoma Welfare Model. These findings suggest that the state of 
Oklahoma share's in recreational water projects should be less than 50 percent 
if it is desired to service the optimal national social welfare visitor days. Figure 2 
depicts the situation for lake Tenkiller in period 5. The aggregated demand 
(DF) for the FCM is located to the right of the demand (DO) for the OWM since it 
has more quantity demanded at a given level of price. Likewise, the aggregate 
supply (S00 ) for the OWM is located to the right of the supply (SF) for the FCM 
since it faces lower capacity costs. The optimal visitor days are about 5,420,000 
and 6,798,000 for the OWM and the FCM respectively. The OWM supply 









Present Value of 
Marginal Gross 
Benefits 
Present Value of 
Marginal Total 
Costs 
Present Value of 
Marginal Net 
Sociai·Benefits 
Marginal Social B/C 
TABLE XV 
COMPARISON OF RECREATION FACILITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS BETWEEN 
FULL COST MODEL AND OKLAHOMA WELFARE MODEL 
Lake Fort Gibson Lake Tenkiller Total 
Full Oklahoma Full Oklahoma Full Oklahoma Full Demand -50% Cost Sharing Rule 
Cost Welfare Cost Welfare Cost Welfare ---------------------------......................................... 
Unit Model Model Model Model Model Model Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total 
Annual 
2,918,974 2,099,183 5,226,000 4,355,872 8,144,974 6,455,055 2,918,974 5,226,000 8,144,974 
3,179,396 2,349,939 5,254,702 4,800,082 8,434,098 7,150,021 3,179,396 5,477,137 8,656,533 
3,728,874 2,491,212 5,104,973 4,877,600 8,833,847 7,368,812 3,728,874 5,343,492 9,072,366 
3,771,831 2,803,051 5,668,148 4,981,505 9,439,979 7,784,556 4,055,269 5,857,227 9,909,496 
4,114,917 3,140,152 6,797,723 5,419,405 10,912,640 8,559,557 4,527,514 6,969,822 11,497,336 
1975$ 2,036,824 1,273,356 9,188,717 4,859,961 11,225,541 6,133,317 3,303,363 1 0,105,536 13,408,899 
1975$ 363,534,605 292,096,91 0 367,345,845 
1975$ 150,842,830 121,023,595 153,001 ,21 0 
1975$ 212,691,775 171,073,315 214,344,635 







Figure 2. Optimal Visitor Days for Lake Tenkiller Period 5 Under 
the Oklahoma Welfare Model and the Full Cost Model 
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As discussed above, to induce the national optimal visitor days the cost sharing 
rule should be lowered in favor of the state of Oklahoma. Note that the 
difference between optimal visitor days under both models constitutes an upper 
bound since it is assumed that the dummy travel zone is not located in 
Oklahoma. That is, the dummy travel zone may include visitor days belonging 
to Oklahoma, which comes from counties outside lake Tenkiller market area but 
within Oklahoma. 
The results also show that it is worthwhile to engage in recreational 
activities since the present value of marginal net social benefits is positive. The 
social benefit-cost ratios are almost the same under the two models and well 
over one. 
Because it is not practical to limit out-of-state visitors or to change the 50-
50 cost sharing rule, the most likely scenario is that the lakes will serve demand 
OF and that the cost sharing rule will persist. This scenario is denominated Full 
Demand 50 Percent Cost Sharing Rule Model (FDCM). The last columns in 
Table XV show that the results from the FDCM are equal or slightly higher than 
those obtained in the FCM, especially in Fort Gibson's case since most of the 
time the recreation capacity constraint is not binding. Moreover, since capacity 
costs are a small fraction of total costs, the shift to the right of the supply curve 
when capacity costs are reduced to 50 percent is rather small. 
CHAPTER VII 
PRICING AND BUDGETARY POLICIES FOR LAKES 
FORT GIBSON AND TENKILLER 
So far it has been assumed that the government is able to enforce 
somehow the optimal social solution provided by the mathematical 
programming model. In this chapter alternative policies to enforce the optimal 
social solution are analyzed with emphasis in pricing and budgetary policies. 
Quantitative restrictions in the visitor day rate are not considered since they are 
unlikely to be applied by either the federal or local governments. 
Pricing Policies at Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller 
Wilman (1988) has recently analyzed pricing policies for outdoor 
recreation. She concludes that marginal cost pricing is an appropriate pricing 
rule when economic efficiency is the objective and if marginal cost prices cover 
costs. Otherwise, it is necessary to supplement marginal cost prices with other 
methods of raising funds or replace this rule entirely by second-best prices such 
as Ramsey prices. It is apparent from the results presented in Chapter IV that 
marginal cost pricing covers costs at lakes Tenkiller and Fort Gibson because 




1) · The objective of the pricing policy is to achieve economic efficiency. 
2) Let the ordered triplet (x, y, z) represent the cost sharing rule in 
percent among the federal government (x), the state and local governments (y), 
and the recreationists (z). The federal government share refers only to new 
investment and refurbishing costs; whereas y and z accounts not only for 
investment and refurbishing costs but also for O&M costs. For example, the cost 
sharing rule (50,75,25) means that the federal government shares 50 percent of 
investment and refurbishing costs, the state and local governments pay 75 
percent of the O&M costs and 75 percent of 50 percent of the investment and 
refurbishing costs, and the recreationists pay 25 percent of O&M costs and 25 
percent of 50 percent of the investment and refurbishing costs. 
3) Throughout this chapter, the federal government share is set at 50 
percent of investment and refurbishing costs according with the guidelines of 
the Water Recreation Act of 1965 (U.S. Statutes at Large, 1965). 
4) The entrance fees are set for the entire season since the 
programming model has an annual specification. The entrance fees are 
announced ex ante to cover all remaining marginal costs if any following the 
specified cost sharing rule. Note that because of the model's annual 
specification and the difficulty in determining when the capacity constraint is 
binding, the entrance fees include investment and refurbishing costs although 
these activities may not be carried out. The implication of this assumption is 
discussed below. 
5) Cross price substitution effects between lakes Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller are included. These price substitution effects are computed 
exogenously altering the convex combination constraint given in equation (5. 7). 
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The new prices are found by adding the recreationists' share of the social costs 
by visitor day to their private travel costs. Equation (5. 7) can be rewritten as 
11 [ 2 2 Ekmc ] 
I, Xtkcs < H 1 - I. Ekmc + I. (Pt 1 ) Ptm s m=1 m=1 - ,m 
m:#:k m:;ek 
to reflect that the substitution effects are exogenous so that only the right hand 
side changes when the price at lake m changes. 
6) Policies at lakes other than Fort Gibson and Tenkiller are assumed 
constant. 
7) The proceeds from the entrance fees are appropriated by the state 
and local governments. 
8) Federal funds for investment and refurbishing costs are never 
binding. 
9) The marginal costs of investment at .lake Tenkiller is assumed 
constant and equal to the average cost of investment as reported in Table X 
($1. 7272 per visitor day capacity). 
Price Policy Specification 
Three cost sharing rules are analyzed: 
1) Recreationists pay the full O&M costs and 50 percent of investment 
and refurbishing costs (50,0,1 00); 
2) The state and local governments pay the full O&M costs and 50 
percent of investment and refurbishing costs (50,1 00,0); and 
3) The state and local governments share equally with the recreationists 
the O&M, investment, and refurbishing costs (50,50,50). 
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The objective function of the programming model given in equation (5.1) is 
modified by introducing cost share parameters that vary according with the cost 
sharing rule. 
Results 
Table XVI presents the principal results obtained from the three pricing 
policy specifications. The entry fees and costs are in 1975 dollars discounted to 
the base year. 
The entry fees for the (50,0,1 00) cost sharing rule in the first period are 
0.2827 and 0.2997 per visitor day for Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller, 
respectively. In terms of entry fees per trip, the corresponding results are $4.21 
and $5.75 per trip in 1975 dollars. 
The attendance at both lakes show an increasing trend across pricing 
policies. As expected, the visitor days are the lowest under the (50,0,1 00) 
scenario and the highest under the (50,1 00,0) scenario for both lakes and all 
time periods. 
Total discounted capacity costs vary from $346,000 to $1,333,807 across 
the different cost sharing rules. Thus, total capacity costs are quite sensitive to 
the cost-sharing rule being used. 
The O&M costs are considerably higher than the capacity costs. Therefore, 
the contribution of the federal government to the recreational activities is small 
with respect to social costs, and of course much smaller with respect to total 
costs. 
The recreationist cost share and the state cost share are computed 
applying the respective cost sharing rule to the capacity and O&M costs. 
TABLE XVI 
COMPARISON OF RECREATION FACILITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS UNDER THREE PRICING POLICIES 
Policy (1) Cost Sharing Rule (50,0, 1 00) Cost Sharing Rule (50,100,0) Cost Sharing Rule (50,50,50) 
Variable Unit Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total Ft. Gibson Ten killer Total 
Discounted Entry 
Fees 1975$/VDAY 
1975-1980 0.2827 0.2997 0.1414 0.1499 
1980-1985 0.2399 0.2441 0.1200 0.1221 
1985-1990 0.2030 0.1962 0.1013 0.0981 
1990-1995 0.1712 0.1548 0.0834 0.0774 
1995-2000 0.1437 0.1192 0.0718 0.0596 
Visitor Days Annual 
1975-1980 2,785,211 5,226,000 8,011,211 5,012,494 6,863,482 11 ,875,976 3,715,118 5,707,251 9,422,369 
1980-1985 3,053,031 5,325,726 8,378,757 5,417,491 8,302,677 13,720,168 4,046,708 6,309,040 10,355,748 
1985-1990 3,547,188 5,307,858 8,855,046 6,123,666 8,131 ,230 14,254,896 4,482,818 7,016,488 11,499,306 
1990-1995 3,882,720 6,393,094 10,275,814 6,714,621 8,884,400 15,599,021 4,974,744 8,241,057 13,215,801 
1995-2000 4,370,392 7,167,403 11,537,795 7,264,630 9,900,240 17,164,870 5,457,625 9,074,056 14,531,681 
Discounted Capacity 
Costs 1975$ 
1975-1980 0 0 0 131,042 308,796 439,838 0 90,754 90,754 
1980-1985 8,856 31,398 40,255 73,280 263,073 336,353 10,620 114,559 125,179 
1985-1990 7,349 45,861 53,210 102,006 94,664 196,670 55,265 136,403 191,668 
1990-1995 38,269 118,498 156,767 81,783 135,880 217,663 57,911 150,727 208,638 
1995-2000 29,863 66,188 96,051 30,430 112,851 143,281 37,368 81,882 119,250 




TABLE XVI (CONTINUED) 
Policy (1) Cost Sharing Rule (50,0, 1 00) Cost Sharing Rule (50, 1 00,0) 
Variable Unit Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total 
Discounted O&M 
Costs 1975$ 
1975-1980 334,226 461,889 796,115 601,499 610,081 1,211,580 
1980-1985 316,029 406,033 722,062 560,782 636,613 1,197,395 
1985-1990 316,732 349,070 665,802 546,787 537,805 1,084,592 
1990-1995 298,827 362,394 661,221 516,779 506,493 1,023,271 
1995-2000 290,376 350,743 641,119 482,674 487,245 969,919 
Federal Cost Share 1975$ 
1975-1980 0 0 0 65,521 154,398 219,919 
1980-1985 4,428 15,699 20,127 36,640 131,537 168,177 
1985-1990 3,674 22,931 26,605 51,003 47,332 98,335 
1990-1995 19,135 59,249 78,384 40,891 67,940 108,831 
1995-2000 14,932 33,094 48,025 15,215 56,426 71,641 
Recreationists Cost 
Share 1975$ 
1975-1980 334,226 461,889 796,115 
1980-1985 320,457 421,732 742,190 
1985-1990 320,406 372,001 692,407 
1990-1995 317,962 421,643 739,605 
1995-2000 305,307 383,837 689,144 
Cost Sharing Rule (50,50,50) 
Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total 
445,814 504,422 950,236 
418,887 481,005 899,892 
400,274 461,437 861,711 
382,871 467,147 850,019 
362,613 444,050 806,663 
0 45,377 45,377 
5,310 57,279 62,589 
27,632 68,202 95,834 
28,955 75,363 104,319 
18,684 40,941 59,625 
222,907 274,900 497,807 
212,098 269,142 481,241 
213,953 264,819 478,773 
205,913 271,255 477,169 




TABLE XVI (CONTINUED) 
Policy (1) Cost Sharing Rule (50,0, 1 00) Cost Sharing Rule (50, 1 00,0) Cost Sharing Rule (50,50,50) 
Variable Unit Ft. Gibson Ten killer Total Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total Ft. Gibson Ten killer Total 
State Cost Share 1975$ 
1975-1980 667,020 764,479 1,431,500 222,907 274,900 497,807 
1980-1985 597,422 768,150 1,365,572 212,098 269,142 481,241 
1985-1990 597,790 585,137 1,182,927 213,953 264,819 478,773 
1990-1995 557,670 574,433 1,132,103 205,913 271,255 477,169 
1995-2000 497,889 543,671 1,041,560 190,648 232,496 433,144 
Surplus 1975$ 
1975-1980 453,217 1,104,479 1,557,696 302,266 580,406 882,672 
1980-1985 407,616 862,802 1,270,418 273,357 501,009 774,365 
1985-1990 395,999 646,444 1,042,443 240,174 423,477 663,651 
1990-1995 327,482 508,970 836,452 208,891 366,742 575,633 
1995-2000 307,765 437,123 744,887 201,466 298,127 499,593 
(1) The cost-sharing rule (X,Y,Z) means that the federal government contributes with X percent of capacity costs, the 
state contributes with Y percent of O&M costs and Y percent of X percent of capacity costs, and the recreationists 





Of course, if the economic efficiency objective is followed, the (50,0, 1 00) 
pricing rule is the most appropriate rule because the deadweight losses are 
eliminated. However, entrance fees include capacity costs that are charged to 
all recreationists even if it turns out that these activities are not implemented and 
that only visitor days beyond the recreation capacity constraint should be 
charged the marginal capacity costs. For this reason, the entry fee policy 
produces a surplus that is reported in the last rows of Table XVI. Even with the 
(50,50,50) cost-sharing rule, there is a surplus. 
The existence of a surplus from the (50,0, 1 00) rule can be seen in 
Figure 3. The entrance fee policy is to charge all marginal social costs to each 
recreationist, which result in entrance fee P2 - Po. Assumption number four 
states that it is infeasible to charge P1 - Po to recreationists that attend the lake 
before the recreation capacity constraint (RC) has been reached and then 
charge the full cost to recreationists that attend the lake after the recreation 
capacity is binding. 
The social supply SSak excludes the costs paid by the federal government. 
Once the entrance fees have been set, the demand curve rotates to De due to 
price substitution effects. For the case drawn, the mathematical programming 
model finds optimal visitor days VDAY e· Notice that VDAY e for the case drawn 
is less than RC, so it is not even necessary to implement capacity activities. 
Thus, the marked area represents the surplus resulting from the (50,0, 1 00) cost 
sharing rule. 
Therefore, a more favorable cost sharing rule for the recreationists is 
needed to be consistent with the marginal cost pricing rule. The discontinuity in 
the social supply function makes it difficult to implement marginal cost pricing, 
which suggests that the price policy has to compromise the efficiency criteria. 
Lower entry fees than the ones implied under the (50,50,50) cost rule will make 
Price 
SP 
VDAY8 RC VDAY 




them closer to the actual or so called nominal entry fees. It appears that 
nominal entry fees are not significantly out of line with marginal cost pricing 
given that assumption number four is "realistic." For example, if only O&M costs 
are charged to recreationists, the entry fees for the first period are about $0.12 
and $0.088 per visitor day for Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller, respectively. 
Even though these entry fees were still higher than actual fees for 1975 
(Presley, 1975), they represent about $0.259 and $0.189 per visitor day in 1988 
dollars, which are close to current entry fees at the newer Oklahoma lakes. 
Budgetary Policies for Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller 
In this section an alternative way of rationing visitor days other than pricing 
policies is explored: the state budget. The activities that entail costs in the 
programming model need to be specified also in a cash flow basis to determine 
if the financial requirements meet the available budget. 
Assumptions 
In addition to the assumptions stated previously, the following statements 
are assumed: 
1) The federal government and the recreationists budget share are 
determined on a cost basis as in the previous section, whereas the state and 
local governments match the difference between budget needs and funds 
collected from the federal governments and the recreationists. 
2) It is not possible to borrow or to lend funds across time periods. 
3) Price policy is not feasible. The state and local governments can limit 
attendance only by providing lower financial resources to O&M and capacity 
activities. 
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4) Demand for recreational experiences adjusts to lower expenditures 
on O&M and capacity activities. 
Budgetary Policy Specification 
The objective of this section is to determine if there exists a budgetary 
policy that gives a solution close to the social welfare maximizing visitor days 
and investment plans from the point of view of the state of Oklahoma when 
pricing policy is not feasible to implement because of non-economic reasons. 
Mumy and Hanke (1975) studied the implications for benefit-cost analysis 
when public facilities are underpriced or have a zero price. Their analysis was 
based on the rationing assumption in which each of the demanded 
consumption units at a given price has an equal probability of being satisfied. 
Porter (1977) examined the same issue but assumed that the rationing devices 
for underpriced facilities are queues and congestion. It appears that, in the 
past, the policy for recreational activities at lakes such as Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller have been non-exclusionary (Harrington, 1987). That is, rather than 
rationing attendance, capacity activities have been implemented to 
accommodate the increased demand even though recreationists were not 
paying the social costs of the recreational experience. 
Weitzman (1974) developed a criterion based on a loss function to 
determine the comparative advantage of using prices versus quantities as 
planning devices. He argues that no matter how one type of planning 
instrument is fixed, there is always a corresponding way to set the other such 
that it achieves the same results given the usual convexities assumptions. He 
concludes that quantity policies are better if the marginal cost function is flat and 
the benefit function is sharply curved. In particular, if the cost curves are 
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piecewise linear cost functions with limited number of kinks the quantity policies 
tend to have relative advantage. On the other hand, pricing policies are 
superior if the marginal cost is highly curved and the benefit function is linear. 
He also asserts that conventional economic theory has tended to focus on 
smoothly differentiable production functions neglecting somewhat the activity 
analysis approach with its limited number of alternative production processes, 
resulting in many theoretical results that are based on the convexity property. 
Let the budget policy be denominated Exclusionary Budget Policy (EBP). 
The EBP is defined as the time path of state budget allocations to Lakes Fort 
Gibson and Tenkiller such that the optimal social welfare plan is reached given 
that price policy is not feasible. 
The mathematical programming model is specified similarly to the 
(50, 1 00,0) cost-sharing rule presented in the previous section but with budget 
constraints by lake and time period. The approximated budget constraints are 
determined by computing the cash flow requirements from the results obtained 
from the (50,0, 1 00) cost-sharing rule. 
Results 
Table XVII presents the main results of the EBP, which are compared with 
the (50,0, 1 00) cost-sharing rule. The two first variables refer to the two policies 
being compared: entry fees versus budget allocation. 
The optimal visitor days obtained from the EBP are fairly close to the ones 
obtained with the use of pricing policy. The same conclusion stands regarding 
refurbishing and new capacity activities. 
The budget constraints are binding for both lakes and for all time periods. 
The budget policy has been successful in preventing the high attendance rates 
TABLE XVII 
COMPARISON OF RECREATION FACILITY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER COST SHARING 
RULE (50, 1 00,0) AND EXCLUSIONARY BUDGET POLICY 
Policy (1) Cost Sharing Rule (50,0, 1 00) Exclusionary Budget Policy 
Variable Unit Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total 
Discounted Entry Fees 1975$/VDAY 
1975-1980 0.2827 0.2997 
1980-1985 0.2399 0.2441 
1985-1990 0.2030 0.1962 
1990-1995 0.1712 0.1548 
1995-2000 0.1437 0.1192 
State Budget Allocation 1975$ 
1975-1980 335,000 462,000 797,000 
1980-1985 390,000 635,000 1,025,000 
1985-1990 475,000 850,000 1,325,000 
1990-1995 1,005,000 2,270,000 3,275,000 
1995-2000 1,450,000 2,700,000 4,150,000 
Visitor Days (annual) VDAY 
1975-1980 2,785,211 5,226,000 8,011 ,211 2,791,667 5,197,505 7,989,172 
1980-1985 3,053,031 5,325,726 8,378,757 3,048,161 5,326,511 8,374,672 
1985-1990 3,547,188 5,307,858 8,855,046 3,581,583 4,677,481 8,259,064 
1990-1995 3,882,720 6,393,094 10,275,814 3,900,275 6,767,910 10,668,185 




TABLE XVII (CONTINUED) 
Policy (1) Cost Sharing Rule (50,0, 1 00) Exclusionary Budget Policy 
Variable Unit Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total 
Additions to Capacity VDAY 
-Refurbishing 
1975-1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980-1985 388,782 1,045,200 1,433,982 440,375 1,045,200 1,485,575 
1985-1990 822,000 1,045,200 1,867,200 822,000 1,045,200 1,867,200 
1990-1995 822,000 1,045,200 1,867,200 822,000 1,045,200 1,867,200 
1995-2000 822,000 1,045,200 1,867,200 822,000 1,045,200 1,867,200 
- New Capacity 
1975-1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980-1985 0 99,726 99,726 0 100,511 100,511 
1985-1990 0 350,476 350,476 0 416,272 416,272 
1990-1995 739,126 1,872,077 2,611,203 739,484 1,845,388 2,584,872 
1995-2000 1,313,091 2,283,965 3,597,056 1,322,140 2,266,250 3,588,390 
Total 4,906,999 8,787,044 13,694,043 4,967,999 8,809,221 13,777,220 
Budget for Capacity Costs 1975$ 
1975-1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980-1985 42,766 321,710 364,476 48,441 323,066 371,507 
1985-1990 90,420 754,806 845,226 90,420 868,449 958,869 
1990-1995 1,073,458 3,382,915 4,456,373 1,073,934 3,336,818 4,410,751 
1995-2000 1,836,831 4,094,328 5,931 '159 1,848,866 4,063,731 5,912,597 




TABLE XVII (CONTINUED) 
Policy (1) Cost Sharing Rule (50,0, 1 00) Exclusionary Budget Policy 
Variable Unit Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total Ft. Gibson Tenkiller Total 
Budget for O&M Costs 1975$ 
1975-1980 334,226 461,889 796,115 335,000 461,996 796,996 
1980-1985 366,364 470,703 837,067 365,779 473,463 839,242 
1985-1990 425,663 469,124 894,787 429,790 415,772 845,562 
1990-1995 465,927 565,040 1,030,967 468,033 601,586 1,069,619 
1995-2000 524,447 633,476 1 '157,923 525,567 668,129 1,193,696 
Federal Budget Share 1975$ 
1975-1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980-1985 1,228 9,238 10,466 1,391 9,277 10,667 
1985-1990 2,596 21,673 24,270 2,596 24,937 27,533 
1990-1995 30,823 97,137 127,960 30,837 95,813 126,650 
1995-2000 52,743 117,564 170,307 53,088 116,686 169,774 . 
Recreationists Budget 
Share 1975$ 
1975-1980 334,226 461,889 796,115 
1980-1985 367,592 479,941 847,533 
1985-1990 428,259 490,797 919,057 
1990-1995 496,750 662,177 1,158,927 
1995-2000 577,190 751,040 1,328,230 
Present Value of $1,000 211,640 232,615 
Marginal Net Benefits 
(1) The cost-sharing rule (X,Y,Z) means that the federal government contributes with X percent of capacity costs, the state contributes withy ....... 
percent of O&M costs and Y percent of X percent of capacity costs, and the recreationists contribute with Z percent of O&M costs and z ....... 
percent of X percent of capacity costs. ....... 
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reached when recreationists do not pay any of the social costs as was shown in 
Table XVI under the (50,1 00,0) cost-sharing rule. However, the state and local 
governments need to commit greater financial resources since they must run an 
economic deficit and also cover the cash flow deficit because the federal 
government makes payments according with the cost incurred within a given 
period which are much smaller than the corresponding required budget. 
The principal limitation of using the state's budget as a rationing device is 
that high willingness-to-pay recreationists may be excluded from the market. 
For example, the first groups that are served by the lake may be the low 
willingness-to-pay consumers, who may use up the services provided by the 
state and local governments in detriment of the high willingness-to-pay 
consumers that decide not to attend the site. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, POLICY GUIDELINES, 
AND STUDY LIMITATIONS 
Summary 
The principal objective of this study was to determine the optimal allocation 
of investment funds among competing lakes for water-based recreation 
activities under alternative government policies. The government policies 
analyzed were entry fees, state and/or local budget allocations between lakes, 
and alternative cost-sharing rules among the federal, state and local 
governments, and recreationists. The effects of these policies were studied 
using models that are consistent with economic choice theory. That is, the 
government in setting its policies recognizes that recreationists behave as if 
they were optimizing their own welfare. 
A conceptual planning model was first presented that allows the 
identification of the elements that constitute a recreational planning model. The 
main elements are: the marginal benefits and costs of outdoor recreation, the 
marginal productivities of each site, the interest rate, and the budget constraints, 
if any, for maintaining and expanding the sites' capacities. A literature review 
was presented on each of these elements. 
Marginal benefits were estimated using McFadden's discrete choice 
multinomial legit model to specify a trip distribution function coupled with a 
regional gravity model including a trip generation function. The procedure 
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followed has several advantages. It handles substitution effects avoiding 
statistical problems such as multicollinearity and zero cells observations; 
provides individual elasticity estimates; fulfills the integrability conditions; and 
separates the price from the quality effect by explicitly considering the site's 
characteristics as quality variables. The procedure is carried out for five 
Oklahoma lakes using· data from a 1975 survey conducted by the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University. 
Marginal costs were estimated for the cost components of the recreational 
social supply function, namely travel costs, operation and maintenance costs, 
capacity costs, and congestion costs. Emphasis was given in estimating 
economies of size for investment in Public Use Areas at Lake Tenkiller and in 
determining the existence of congestion costs at the surveyed Oklahoma lakes. 
A long-run average cost curve for investment was estimated for Lake Tenkiller 
that shows the presence of diseconomies of size in investment. Congestion 
was modeled as if it were an additional characteristic of the sites. Thus, the 
hedonic travel cost model procedure was applied to determine the relevance of 
congestion at the five Oklahoma lakes. 
The planning methodology was empirically applied to two competing 
lakes. Lakes Fort Gibson and Tenkiller were selected as the case study. 
Marginal benefits and costs for recreationists attending Lakes Fort Gibson and 
Tenkiller were projected from 1975 to the year 2000. A spatial intertemporal 
mathematical programming model was specified that solves for the optimal 
levels of visitor days, investment, and operation and maintenance activities 
such that the present value of social welfare is maximized. 
The 50-50 cost-sharing basis of new capital expenditures between the 
federal government and/or state and local participation as stated in the Federal 
Water Project Recreation Act of 1965 was analyzed from the point of view of the 
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state of Oklahoma. The mathematical programming model was solved 
including only Oklahoma counties within the sites' market area and by 
specifying capital costs at 50 percent of the full price. 
Policies rationing attendance at the lakes were needed since marginal 
social costs are higher than marginal private costs in the recreation markets at 
both lakes. Alternative government policies to enforce the optimal solution were 
analyzed with emphasis in pricing and budgetary policies to achieve economic 
efficiency. Cross price substitution effects between the lakes were introduced 
into the mathematical programming model. 
Conclusions 
1. It is worthwhile to implement capacity activities at Lakes Fort Gibson 
and Tenkiller. The present value of marginal social net benefits due to the 
incorporation of capacity activities over the planning period 1975-2000 
increases by about $23.5 million in 1975 prices. 
2. County population, per capita income, travel costs, entry fees, in-state 
and out-of-state location of recreationists, and lake characteristics such as 
number of campsites are important variables explaining the level and 
distribution of visitor days to Oklahoma lakes. Congestion costs appear not to 
be a relevant variable for recreation activities at Oklahoma lakes. 
3. Investment activities at Lake Tenkiller show increasing diseconomies 
of size. 
4. The state of Oklahoma share in recreational water projects at Lakes 
Fort Gibson and Tenkiller should be less than the 50 percent suggested by the 
Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 1965 if it is desired to service the 
optimal national welfare visitor days. 
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5. The so-called nominal entry fees appear to be a good rule of thumb 
given the difficulty of implementing marginal cost prices due to discontinuities in 
the social supply curve. 
6. The state and/or local budgets can be used as policy instruments to 
ration attendance at both lakes when price policy is not feasible. 
Policy Guidelines 
1. If the objective of the planning model is to enhance economic 
efficiency, a policy instrument is needed to ration attendance for recreational 
activities at Oklahoma lakes because social costs are higher than private costs. 
If entry fees set at marginal cost prices are difficult to implement because of non-
economic reasons and discontinuities in the social supply function, a second 
best policy can be implemented by using a combination of nominal entry fees 
and budget allocation. For example, the entry fees may cover O&M costs and 
the state would cover the remaining 50 percent of capacity costs. The planning 
methodology used in this study can be used to investigate the effects of such 
second best policies. 
2. Further research on the appropriate cost share between the federal 
government and state and/or local participation is needed to determine the 
convenience of the current 50-50 cost-sharing rule. 
Limitations 
1. The results of this study are limited by the accuracy of the data, 
software availability, and assumptions used. More specifically, better estimates 
for unobserved travel costs and sites destinations; and maximum likelihood 
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estimation of the trip distribution function should yield better estimates of the 
demand and benefit functions. 
2. Alternative assumptions about the recreation capacity measure at 
both lakes and its decay through time were not explored. 
3. Alternative methods of estimating congestion costs other than the 
hedonic travel cost method were not carried out due to data limitations. 
4. A nonlinear mathematical programming algorithm may be more 
appropriate if it is desired to solve endogenously for the optimal path of the 
entry fees. 
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County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenkiller 
Adair OK 75 46 33 
Atoka OK 82 126 
Bryan OK 114 157 
Cherokee OK 66 13 31 
Choctaw OK 124 151 
Cleveland OK 133 158 162 
Coal OK 87 125 
Craig OK 120 69 76 92 
Creek OK 99 56 16 45 84 
Delaware OK 116 72 
Garvin OK 148 174 
Haskell OK 20 57 46 
Hughes OK 79 111 
Johnston OK 121 165 
Latimer OK 37 73 
LeFlore OK 57 58 
Lincoln OK 129 107 47 135 
Logan OK 170 73 163 
McClain OK 145 172 
McCurtain OK 167 165 
Mcintosh OK 20 49 92 53 
Mayes OK 77 42 58 27 67 
Murray OK 152 173 
Muskogee OK 36. 13 67 26 
Noble OK 176 72 164 
Nowata OK 126 63 22 113 
Okfuskee OK 73 47 85 
Oklahoma OK 141 153 95 146 157 
Okmulgee OK 66 53 49 60 58 
Osage OK 138 107 52 53 134 
Ottawa OK 144 106 
Pawnee OK 125 118 44 136 
Payne OK 164 48 146 
Pittsburg OK 42 81 
Pontotoc OK 114 142 
Pottowatomie OK 106 73 124 
Pushmataha OK 103 131 
Rogers OK 93 54 41 10 81 
Seminole OK 109 69 117 
Sequoyah OK 47 57 22 
Tulsa OK 86 54 14 32 82 
Wagoner OK 53 19 56 46 
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SOURCE: Schreiner, D. F., D. A. Willet, D. D. Badger, and L. G. Antle. Recreation Benefits 
Measured by Travel Cost Method for McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation 
System and Application to Other Selected Corps Lakes, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers Contract Report 85-C-1, 1985. 
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TABLE XIX 
OBSERVED TRAVEL COSTS FROM COUNTIES WITHIN LAKE 
TENKILLER MARKET AREA TO OKLAHOMA LAKES 
($NDAY) 
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County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenkiller 
Adair OK 0.456 1.587 0.000 0.000 0.228 
Atoka OK 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.906 
Bryan OK 0.693 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.129 
Cherokee OK 0.401 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.620 
Choctaw OK 0.754 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.086 
Cleveland OK 1.721 1.090 0.000 0.000 1.146 
Coal OK 0.529 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.899 
Craig OK 0.730 0.238 0.914 0.000 0.662 
Creek OK 3.416 0.594 0.152 0.414 0.305 
Delaware OK 0.705 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.242 
Garvin OK 3.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.251 
Haskell OK 0.360 0.545 0.000 0.000 0.331 
Hughes OK 0.545 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.547 
Johnston OK 0.736 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.187 
Latimer OK 0.537 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.525 
LeFlore OK 0.656 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.320 
Lincoln OK 2.967 0.778 0.116 0.000 0.971 
Logan OK 0.978 0.000 0.878 0.000 0.402 
McClain OK 2.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McCurtain OK 1.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mcintosh OK 0.029 0.451 1.106 0.000 0.000 
Mayes OK 0.468 1.449 0.697 0.177 0.925 
Murray OK 0.924 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.244 
Muskogee OK 0.710 0.215 0.805 0.000 0.315 
Noble OK 1.070 0.000 1.242 0.00 3.772 
Nowata OK 0.766 0.000 0.757 0.607 0.813 
Okfuskee OK 0.262 0.000 0.565 0.000 0.611 
Oklahoma OK 0.857 1.242 0.983 1.321 1.082 
Okmulgee OK 0.683 1.219 0.589 0.680 0.445 
Osage OK 0.839 0.591 1.794 0.697 1.156 
Ottawa OK 0.875 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.762 
Pawnee OK 0.760 0.000 1.214 0.000 0.978 
Payne OK 0.997 2.714 0.386 0.000 2.519 
Pittsburg OK 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.726 
Pontotoc OK 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.021 
Pottowatomie OK 0.650 0.000 0.878 0.000 1.180 
Pushmataha OK 0.626 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.942 
Rogers OK 2.139 0.569 2.829 0.242 0.583 
Seminole OK 1.003 0.000 1.587 0.000 0.734 
Sequoyah OK 0.286 0.545 0.000 0.000 0.202 
Tulsa OK 0.890 0.468 0.223 0.497 0.772 
Wagoner OK 0.322 0.524 1.546 0.000 0.423 
Washington OK 0.742 1.196 1.766 0.630 0.994 
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TABLE XIX (CONTINUED) 
County State Eufaula Ft. Gibson Keystone Oologah Tenkiller 
Benton AR 0.961 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.880 
Boone AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.259 
Carroll AR 1.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.093 
Conway AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.021 
Crawford AR 0.438 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.427 
Franklin AR 0.657 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.748 
Garland AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.230 
Howard AR 1.331 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.546 
Johnson AR 0.772 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.885 
Logan AR 0.650 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.734 
Madison AR 0.954 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.770 
Marion AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.618 
Montgomery AR 0.948 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.654 
Newton AR 1.289 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.352 
Perry AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.093 
Pike AR 1.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.388 
Polk AR 0.912 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.050 
Pope AR 0.924 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.064 
Scott AR 0.717 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.827 
Searcy AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.568 
Sebastian AR 1.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.519 
Sevier AR 1.192 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.374 
Washington AR 0.790 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.437 
Yell AR 1.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.108 
Chautauqua KS 0.000 0.000 0.962 0.000 1.223 
Cherokee KS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.928 
Crawford KS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.100 
La bette KS 0.967 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.942 
Montgomery KS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.230 
Neosho KS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.208 
Barry MO 1.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.928 
Barton MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.208 
Jasper MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.064 
Lawrence MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.215 
McDonald MO 0.882 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.741 
Newton MO 0.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.863 
Stone MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.151 
Taney MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.453 
Lamar TX 0.924 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.287 
Red River TX 1.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.510 
SOURCE: Badger, Daniel D., Dean F. Schreiner, and Ronald W. Presley. Aoal:isis Qf 
E~12~Ddilur~s fQ[ QuldQQ( B~Qr~atiQD allb~ MQQI~IIao-~~rr Arkaosas Bi~~r ~a~igaliQD 
System. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Contract Report 77-4, 1977. 
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TOTAL INCOME, PER CAPITA INCOME, POPULATION, 
AND POPULATION PROJECTION FOR THE 
YEAR 2000 BY COUNTIES 
Total1975 1975 Per Year1975 Year 2000 
Income Capita Population Projected 
County State ($1 ,000) Income($) (1 ,000) Population (1) 
Adair OK 45,671 2,674 17,080 22,900 
Atoka OK 30,790 2,551 12,070 13,700 
Bryan OK 106,664 3,867 27,583 34,300 
Cherokee OK 86,530 3,240 26,707 42,200 
Choctaw OK 49,607 2,666 18,607 17,000 
Cleveland OK 499,599 4,762 104,914 232,700 
Coal OK 18,324 3,049 6,010 5,500 
Craig OK 69,645 4,378 14,699 13,400 
Creek OK 223,496 4,343 51,461 92,900 
Delaware OK 58,841 2,894 20,332 36,500 
Garvin OK 119,337 4,432 26,926 28,900 
Haskell OK 34,813 3,417 10,188 12,900 
Hughes OK 51,062 3,527 14,477 15,700 
Johnston OK 28,074 2,998 9,364 12,500 
Latimer OK 31,885 3,165 10,074 11 ,400 
LeFlore OK 117,537 3,198 36,753 52,400 
Lincoln OK 92,574 4,128 22,426 41,200 
Logan OK 90,780 3,774 24,054 39,400 
McClain OK 73,353 4,038 18,166 33,800 
McCurtain OK 107,585 2,887 37,265 41,700 
Mcintosh OK 45,244 3,331 13,583 20,900 
Mayes OK 119,417 4,255 28,065 44,500 
Murray OK 41,597 3,857 10,785 14,500 
Muskogee OK 300,379 4,830 62,190 68,500 
Noble OK 47,163 4,512 10,453 13,100 
Nowata OK 45,162 4,267 10,584 12,600 
Okfuskee OK 37,024 3,256 11,371 14,400 
Oklahoma OK 3,430,262 6,238 549,898 696,800 
Okmulgee OK 146,926 3,985 36,870 45,200 
Osage OK 129,617 3,941 32,889 55,200 
Ottawa OK 136,984 4,386 31,232 37,700 
Pawnee OK 55,029 4,210 13,071 23,000 
Payne OK 224,386 4,019 55,831 75,800 
Pittsburg OK 147,429 3,739 39,430 47,600 
Pontotoc OK 134,775 4,443 30,334 36,700 
Pottowatomie OK 225,053 4,458 50,483 84,500 
Pushmataha OK 26,988 2,527 10,680 14,100 
Rogers OK 155,817 4,316 36,102 79,000 
Seminole OK 111 ,020 4,040 27,480 43,700 
Sequoyah OK 87,931 3,202 27,461 42,000 
Tulsa OK 2,944,762 6,939 424,378 606,500 
Wagoner OK 107,522 3,521 30,537 76,700 
Washington OK 323,779 7,748 41,789 54,900 
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TABLE XX (CONTINUED) 
Total1975 1975 Per Year1975 Year2000 
Income Capita Population Projected 
County State ($1 ,000) Income($) (1 ,000) Population (1) 
Benton AR 308,690 5,270 58,575 
Boone AR 104,708 4,586 22,832 
Carroll AR 62,175 4,398 14,137 
Conway AR 74,198 4,160 17,836 
Crawford AR 120,634 4,036 29,889 
Franklin AR 51,348 4,004 12,824 
Garland AR 312,655 5,069 61,680 
Howard AR 60,732 4,638 13,094 
Johnson AR 60,633 3,961 15,307 
Logan AR 75,783 4,140 18,305 
Madison AR 38,727 3,853 10,051 
Marion AR 33,784 3,589 9,413 
Montgomery AR 24,476 3,794 6,451 
Newton AR 16,341 2,457 6,651 
Perry AR 23,549 3,440 6,846 
Pike AR 33,349 3,509 9,504 
Polk AR 58,672 3,995 14,686 
Pope AR 150,394 4,470 33,645 
Scott AR 32,593 3,589 9,081 
Searcy AR 21,509 2,638 8,154 
Sebastian AR 461,207 4,232 108,981 
Sevier AR 52,213 4,219 12,376 
Washington AR 396,337 4,844 81,820 
Yell AR 66,360 4,053 16,373 
Chautauqua KS 20,920 4,502 4,647 
Cherokee KS 92,646 4,338 21,357 
Crawford KS 183,172 4,986 36,737 
La bette KS 111,028 4,470 24,838 
Montgomery KS 216,050 5,552 38,914 
Neosho KS 99,077 5,387 18,392 
Barry MO 91,613 4,228 21,668 
Barton MO 43,578 3,975 10,963 
Jasper MO 395,174 4,809 82,174 
Lawrence MO 112,947 4,096 27,575 
McDonald MO 42,348 2,760 15,343 
Newton MO 139,978 3,856 36,301 
Stone MO 48,809 3,860 12,645 
Taney MO 78,209 4,546 17,204 
Lamar TX 167,985 4,484 37,463 
Red River TX 54,593 3,757 14,531 
(1) Out-of-state counties estimates computed using their state population projected growth rate. 
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 796, Illustrative 
PrQj!;lQ!iQn~ Qf ~tS!l!il EQb!Yiri!liQn~ Q~ Ag!;l, Bri!~!il. ri!nd ~ex; :HilZ~ lQ 20QO, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1979. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Local Areri! PersQnal Income 
1974-1979, Vol. 7, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1981. 
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